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ABSTRACT

Author: Swain, Shelby E. MS
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: December 2017
Title: An Empirical Analysis of The Farm Bill and the Impact of a Seat on the United
States Senate Agriculture Committee
Major Professor: Dr. Lawrence DeBoer
The purpose of this study is to do a thorough investigation of what influences
farm program payments for a state by examining the United States farm bill and the
impact of having a seat on the United States Senate Agriculture Committee. Specifically,
this study explores the empirical aspects of the farm bill to determine the most influential
factors in the creation of a farm bill, and investigates the impact a political position holds
on farm program payments at the state level. This thesis can be used as a foundational
understanding of the farm bill, as well as provide insight into a state’s congressional
representation that can aid constituents in voting decisions.
In order to prepare for the study, extensive research was done on the United States
farm bill. A background and brief history of the farm bill is provided, as well as a titleby-title description, including the programs encompassed in each title. With the farm bill
being such a unique piece of legislation, there are four specific factors described that are
unique to the farm bill and the subsequent debates: the farm economy, the budget, the
nutrition title, and farm bill politics. In order to grasp the scope of the farm bill, a
number of visuals are used to display the data associated with the farm bill. An example
of how the farm bill works for a specific state, Indiana, is also used to provide an
additional perspective. This insight of an invested constituency helps set the stage for
understanding what a Senator on the Senate Agriculture Committee is representing. An
extensive literature review considers the transformations of the agricultural sector over
the last century, as well as previous research of constituency representation and
agricultural interests.
This thesis uses data from all fifty United States from 1989 through 2015 that has
been collected by United States federal agencies. The OLS panel data method was used
to execute the estimation. The estimation strategy models farm program payments as a

xii
function of government program participation, agriculture production, and farm
characteristics, as well as constituent representation. The regression equations are tested
four times: (a) the first with a baseline, (b) the second with the Number of Senators on the
Agriculture Committee variable only, (c) the third with the Chairman binary variable
only, and (d) the fourth with both constituency representation independent variables
included.
The thesis results are consistent with literature research. The first conclusion
being that constituent interests drive farm program payments received by a state,
specifically in the constituency represented by a Senator on the Senate Agriculture
Committee. The next conclusion is that a state does not necessarily need its Senator to
serve as the Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee in order to receive significant
farm program payments. The final conclusion found there are programs in the farm bill
that are not influenced by constituency representation, and there are specific crops that
have more influence over certain farm program payments. The farm bill is a significant
piece of legislation and one of the most influential pieces of agricultural policy legislation
in the United States and this thesis ultimately strives for a deeper understanding of the
farm bill.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Agriculture policy is an art form. It comes in a variety of mediums and
interpretations. It builds on itself. It has trends and fads that linger and dwindle through
the changes of culture and society. At its center, sits the pinnacle of agriculture policy:
the farm bill. The farm bill in itself is a masterpiece. It is a Jackson Pollock painting
hanging in a museum for all to see, many to interpret and few to appreciate. At first
glance, a Pollock painting is a winding web of colors, begging for interpretation, order
and reason; no beginning or end; caught in an everlasting debate. When Jackson Pollock
began his career, he was considered a genius because he introduced new technique to the
abstract style of art. Pollock changed how things were done because he had a new idea of
how to do things. By that definition, every piece of legislation could be considered a
stroke of genius.
So what makes the farm bill a Jackson Pollock masterpiece? The farm bill, at first
glance, is hundreds of pages of legislative text intertying across years and versions of
itself, begging for interpretation to bring order and reason. The farm bill represents a
history of United States agriculture constantly improving and evolving to the needs of
modern-day’s constituents. It puts into action new ideas using new methods that can
revolutionize the way agriculture thinks and works in everyday life. Just as Jackson
Pollock’s art still finds influence in the world 75 years later, the farm bill’s relevancy,
since its 1933 creation, has made it one of the most influential pieces of agriculture policy
legislation.
Agriculture policy in the United States, and more specifically the farm bill, is
once again at a climax point during an invigorated period of American politics and policy
discussions that are overpowering previously accepted norms. Policy is constantly
rebuilding as society navigates across a vast cultural world and the farm bill, alone, has
created its share of ideological debate and drama. That being said, the realm of
agriculture policy reaches every corner of every industry and seems to find its footprint in
unlikely places and, therefore, opens itself to the never ending debates. But why is the
farm bill, specifically, so impactful and influential?

2
For starters, the farm bill holds a lot of statutory power. From farm program
payments to food policy and a little of everything in between, the farm bill provides
mandatory and discretionary funding to a number of everyday programs and functions.
In a related note, the farm bill has something for everybody. Its impact and influence
carries across all social demographics, including race, sex, age, occupation, income, and
region. And lastly, the farm bill has a unique timeline that forces all to stand in attention.
The farm bill is designed to expire every five years and there have been seventeen farm
bills since the 1930s (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017). What would happen
if we let it expire and/or not extend the programs in their current form? All programs
would revert back to the 1949 version that dictated which provisions were considered
“permanent legislation”. Accordingly, the urgency to complete the renewal persists to
avoid reverting back to prices for only certain commodities applicable at the time,
adjusted for inflation (Mercier, 2016). The ramifications of that uncertainty push
legislators to renew the farm bill and renew it efficiently.
For agricultural economists, the farm bill creates a wide variety of opportunity for
analysis and interpretation. Professional agricultural economists, either employed within
an organization or as private consultants or university professors, use the farm bill to dive
deeper into the context of the specific policy ideas. These can then be presented to a
group of people, usually membership of an organization or other policy influencers, to
evaluate the programs. Normally a cost-benefit analysis is included regarding a proposed
policy implementation. Other agricultural economists will provide research using a
specific expertise to provide independent, balanced analyses of farm program proposals,
usually as a reinforcing arm to the research agencies used by the United States
government. A separate role for agricultural economists in the farm bill process is to
provide research and analyses that could explore the farm bill process, possibly in a form
favorable or unfavorable to the political ideology of the farm bill.
This analysis will be different from traditional agricultural economic research in
various ways. Traditional agricultural policy research would normally analyze the costs,
benefits, impacts and incidences of specific farm programs, but the process of the policy,
as mentioned earlier, has not been analyzed as thoroughly. With emphasis on the
dynamics of the political-economic system within the farm bill, prior research and a deep
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understanding of the political system are essential to the research. Specific, relevant
variables and their estimation will take in consideration not only the factors that can be
quantified, but also the political dynamics unable to be captured outside of a committee
room. The broader research question to be answered is what influences farm program
payments for a state? The role of the agricultural economist to investigate this research
question in this thesis will be to explore the empirical aspects of the farm bill, determine
the most influential factors, and then investigate what impact a political position holds on
farm program payments at the state level.
What is the Farm Bill
The farm bill is a phrase coined to refer to an omnibus of spending bills
appropriated to provide assistance to needs related to food and farms. This multi-year
law, primarily executed by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
governs a wide variety of agricultural and food programs and is renewed about every five
years (Johnson & Monke, What Is the Farm Bill?, 2017). The farm bill, overall, is
important because of its long-standing history in the United States. First created to help
struggling farmers in the 1930s, the farm bill has expanded to be a resource to help the
industry grow and thrive in an ever-evolving world. The current farm bill, the
Agriculture Act of 2014, is set to expire on September 30, 2018. To prepare for the 2018
farm bill, discussions about how best to address the issues of agriculture have already
begun. These will be especially important given the transformations the agriculture
sector has experienced over the last century and the various unknowns facing the future
of farms.
As previously mentioned, there is a strong sense of urgency to pass a farm bill
before the previous one is set to expire. Letting a farm bill expire creates a spiral of
ramifications. Farm commodity programs would not only follow suit and expire, but also
revert back to the original, permanent law enacted in 1949. Some programs of the farm
bill considered discretionary programs would not only expire, but would also lose the
statutory authority to receive appropriated money. Nutrition assistance programs, though
require reauthorization, could be maintained through appropriation bills. However, that
would require a final appropriation bill to pass through the legislative process, which is
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rare, even in what would seem perfect political and economic conditions. This is what
makes funding the farm bill tricky. To elaborate, there are two spending categories:
mandatory and discretionary spending. “Mandatory spending programs generally operate
as entitlements” (Johnson & Monke, What Is the Farm Bill?, 2017). In this situation, a
bill pays for the program it entails through multi-year budget estimates, known as the
baseline, when the law is enacted (Johnson & Monke, What Is the Farm Bill?, 2017).
Discretionary spending programs are authorized for their scope, but the farm bill does not
fund the program. Rather, the discretionary program is subject to annual appropriations
procedures (Johnson & Monke, What Is the Farm Bill?, 2017). In the end, all programs
require money to be appropriated in order to carry out the necessary operations and that is
what is at stake in each debate.
The farm bill holds an important role as being the predictable opportunity for
policymakers to comprehensively and periodically address agricultural issues. The farm
bill has taken on many facets, but traditionally has focused on farm commodity program
support for what is referred to as the farm coalition. These commodities would include
corn, cotton, wheat, soybeans, rice, dairy, peanuts, and sugar. In most recent years, the
farm bill has expanded and broadened its coalition to include nutrition assistance,
conservation, research, specialty crops, and bioenergy programs. In what may seem as
conflicting interests, the farm bill brings together the most unlikely partners to advocate
for the same piece of legislation that individually may not survive the legislative
bureaucracy, but together have enough orchestrated interest to succeed.
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Brief History of the Farm Bill
In order to analyze the farm bill, one must understand the vast history of farm
bills across time. Historical experience is an important source of cognitive learning.
Committee members are working on information from memory in a language unique only
to agricultural policy (Boynton, 1990). So understanding where the farm bill started and
how it got to be what it is today will help bring insight to the language that must be
learned in order to understand the agricultural policy behind the farm bill.
The very first farm bill was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA) in a
time when all of the United States was facing hardships related to the Great Depression.
Farmers felt the economic shock of the stock market crash as it shuttered through the
economy, but the most predominant blow to farmers was the softening of aggregate
demand for their products. As demand dwindled, farmers saw some of the lowest prices
for commodities in decades. In the next instant, the Dust Bowl of 1931 hit the Southern
Plains states with severe drought and persistently high winds. Yields declined while
conditions primed for the Dust Bowl sustained for eight years (Mercier, 2016). These
factors inflated the rate of people leaving farms and rural areas to more opportunities in
other parts of the country, primarily urban areas. In the 1930s, it is estimated that farmer
per-capita income was about one-third compared to the rest of the country (Mercier,
2016). Relief became a desperate call.
The 2-title, 54-page AAA was part of the New Deal era and aimed to boost farm
income. It held the ‘Agricultural Adjustment’ title and the ‘Agricultural Credits’ title.
The policies were designed to reduce the amount of agriculture commodities produced by
paying farmers a subsidy to withhold some of their land from cultivation. By reducing
supply, the policy intended for the prices received for the crops that were actually planted
to increase in the market. The credit portion established a government loan rate that
could hold the farmer’s crop as collateral. If the crop prices fell below the cost to repay
the loan, the farmer could forfeit the crop to the government.
Separate legislation was created to address issues related to agriculture throughout
the rest of the 1930s and 1940s, such as the Farm Credit Act, the establishment of the
Commodity Credit Corporation and the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act.
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The 1936 farm bill first directly linked soil conservation to commodity programs. The
1949 farm bill established the policy of high, fixed-price supports and acreage allotments
as permanent farm policy that, in the event a new farm bill failed to pass, the programs
were to revert to this 1949 bill. In 1954, flexible price supports in commodity programs
were introduced. The 1956 farm bill established the Soil Bank Program and was the first
time a farm bill included land to be set aside for conservation purposes. The Soil Bank
paid rental payments for retired cropland, as well as paid financial incentives for farmers
to plant cover crops (USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service, n.d.). However, the
program failed and ended after only two years.
The 1960’s farm policy era saw a collision of ideologies, and attempts to support
commodity prices through legislation were becoming more and more difficult. Farm bills
in this age were short-term, commodity-by-commodity bills that were drug through brutal
political fights all while the industry faced building surpluses and depressed prices.
Combined with dwindling farm and rural populations, the farm coalition was at an
impasse on how to get a farm bill passed through Congress. Then the nutrition title
entered the farm bill policy discussions, primarily because it, too, followed a 5-year
reauthorization. Known as the Food Stamp Act of 1964, the bill was leveraged for all its
bargaining power. In order to pass a cotton and wheat bill on the floor, House leadership
scheduled the Food Stamp Act vote with the cotton and wheat vote, passing the Food
Stamp Act first (Kuethe & Coppess, 2014). This forced the votes and gained enough
attention on the floor to accomplish what needed to be done for the legislation.
In the following years, when the reauthorization came for both farm legislation
and food stamp legislation, the two bills were drug through debate once again, each being
used against each other, both being used as leverage for votes on other, unrelated bills.
At the tipping point of debate, food stamp supporters, primarily from urban-populated
districts, were adamant they would not vote for a farm-only legislation if fights continued
to be against food stamps. After the House wanted to combine the two in 1970
legislation, when both were set to expire, the Senate and the Nixon administration fought
back and the two remained separated. The finale came during the appropriations process,
when both bills were repeatedly targeted for spending and ideology. During the 1973
farm bill reauthorization, the House and Senate Agriculture Committees agreed to
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combine the two and the bills became one omnibus. The food stamps portion gained
primarily urban support, while the farm portion brought in rural votes. Following this
resolution, since 1977, the Food Stamp Act of 1964 has been included as permanent
legislation in the farm bill.
The 1973 farm bill was not only a pinnacle landmark in food policy, but it also
revolutionized commodity programs for farm policy. The bill at this time introduced
target prices and deficiency payments that would replace price supports. The policy
would pay farmers when the average market prices fell below the Congressionally-fixed
target prices. These were coupled with low commodity loan rates. This change was
primarily intended to move producers away from government programs and closer to
relying on markets that would allow free movement of commodities at world prices.
These debates continue to be the largest debates among commodity producers in farm
policy. Midwestern farmers growing corn and soybeans preferred more market-based
programs and Southern cotton, rice, and peanut farmers and Great Plains farmers favored
forms of price supports and high, fixed loan rates (Coppess, 2017).
In years following, the farm bill evolved and progressed with the needs of the
agricultural industry. 1970 saw the first inclusion of an individual rural development title
in a farm bill. The 1977 farm bill included the first separated title for agricultural
research, though it had been included in previous bills as provisions in other titles. The
1980s farm bill saw the largest growth in crop insurance, with availability expanding and
premium subsidies increasing for greater accessibility, all in the hopes of replacing the
disaster payment program (O'Donoghue, Government Programs & Risk, n.d.).
The 1996 farm bill consolidated all of the commodity program provisions into one
single title. In the prior farm bills, each commodity had its own title (i.e. dairy, wool and
mohair, wheat and feed grains, cotton, rice, peanuts, soybeans, sugar, etc.). However, it
also replaced price support and supply control programs with direct payment programs.
These would be payments based on historical production numbers. Direct payment
programs later became central among farm groups debating the 2014 farm bill.
The 2002 farm bill added in the energy title, as well as followed up with the
commodity programs’ direct payments by adding counter-cyclical programs. These
commodity payments would be triggered when current prices fell below a target level,

8
still based on historical production. The conservation title introduced working-lands
programs to compliment lands held in reserve and out of production. Planting flexibility
and direct payments continued.
The 2008 farm bill gave crop insurance and horticultural/specialty crops each its
own title (Mercier, 2016). But 2014 brought some of the most revolutionary changes to
modernize and make the policies applicable. The 2014 farm bill eliminated direct
payments for farmers and in turn created a revenue-based support program and a more
market-based counter-cyclical price support program that continue to rely on statutory
target prices. The 2014 farm bill also mainstreamed the conservation title by
consolidating 23 programs into 13, among various other changes (USDA ERS, 2017).
The farm bill continues to find itself entangled in political debates and policy
ideological conversations as they evolve over time. The conversation has often
questioned whether the programs that are current policy were tailored for a time in
American agriculture that no longer exists. But over time, programs have been adjusted
to respond to “the political, social, and economic pressures that agricultural productivity
growth, market integration, and structural changes have imposed on the farm sector”
(Dimitri, Effland, & Conklin, 2005). As ideas are collected for future farm bills, even in
today’s debate, the question remains the same: what does the farm bill need to do to serve
its constituents?
Titles of 2014 Farm Bill
Continuing with a brief history of the farm bill, each specific title has its own
history. Some titles were not included in the farm bill until years after the policy was
initially passed in legislation, and some have been in the farm bill since its initial
inception. In order to get a better understanding of the farm bill, a background of each
title and the programs encompassed in the titles must be explained. The following
section describes the titles of all the titles as the 2014 farm bill was passed.
Title I: Commodities and Disaster
The commodity title has provided benefits based on price or revenue targets for
commodity growers in the United States. “Covered commodities”, as they are often
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referred to, include corn and feed grains, wheat, rice, soybeans, and other oil seeds,
peanuts, and pulses, as well as transitional assistance for upland cotton producers during
the creation and implementation of a marketing insurance program (Shields, 2015).
Additional commodities have options for assistance through marketing assistance loans,
non-recourse loans, marketing allotments, and others (USDA ERS, 2017). Commodity
programs receive about 4.8 percent of the $489 billion 2014 farm bill, which equates to
about $23.56 billion over the fiscal year 2014-2018 period (Johnson, Previewing a 2018
Farm Bill, 2017).
The 2014 farm bill ended the Direct Payment Program (DPP), which provided a
fixed annual payment to producers on historical base acres and yields regardless if the
farm experienced a loss. It also ended the Countercyclical Payments (CCP) that provided
producers payments on historical base acres and yields triggered by movements in prices.
The Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program was also repealed which paid
producers when revenues fell below specific benchmark levels (Cooper, O'Donoghue, &
Hungerford, 2017). The following program options replaced these as a way to save
money in the budget baseline and provide producers with more risk management options.
A chart of the programs is available in Appendix 2 (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm
Bill, 2017).
Programs Available in Title I: Commodities and Disaster
Two new programs were created to fill the void of those repealed: Price Loss
Coverage (PLC) and Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC). PLC provided a payment when
the price of a crop drops below a reference price stated in the statute. It is considered a
“revamped version of the counter-cyclical price support program” (Johnson, 2017). ARC
covers losses in revenue at either the individual farm level (ARC-Individual Coverage or
ARC-IC) or at the county level (ARC-County or ARC-CO). Both programs were set up
to make payments on historic base acres and were decoupled from production to
minimize the programs’ influence on the farmers’ decisions for what and where to plant
crops (U.S. Senator Debbie Stabenow, Chairwoman, 2014). Both programs only apply to
wheat, corn, grain sorghum, oats, barley, long grain rice, medium grain rice, pulse crops
(dry peas, lentils, small chickpeas, and large chickpeas), soybeans, sunflower seed,
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rapeseed, canola, safflower, flaxseed, mustard seed, crambe, sesame seed, and peanuts,
while excluding upland cotton which was removed due to the proceedings of a World
Trade Organization case settlement with Brazil (USDA ERS, 2017). These program
payments are subject to an adjusted gross income cap of no more than $900,000 in both
on-farm and off-farm annual income (Shields, 2015). Each person can only receive up to
$125,000 in annual commodity payments (Shields, 2015). The ARC programs were
designed to serve the needs of corn, soybean, and wheat growers, while PLC was
designed to serve the other commodities, like peanuts.
As mentioned above, nonrecourse Marketing Assistance Loans are available in
addition to these programs, as well as an extended list of commodities, including upland
cotton, extra-long staple cotton, wool, mohair, and honey. Sugar growers have a pricesupport program available independently to the commodity that involves non-recourse
loans, marketing allotments, and import quotas. Dairy programs were significantly
changed to include a new program, the Dairy Margin Protection Program. This voluntary
program makes payments to voluntary participating farmers when the national margin,
calculated by subtracting the national-average feed cost ration by the national average
farm price for all milk, falls below the producer-selected insured margin. This margin
can range from $4.00 per hundredweight (cwt.) to $8.00/cwt (USDA Farm Service
Agency, 2016).
Title II: Conservation
Title II Conservation programs are intended to incentivize producers and
landowners to adopt conservation activities on agricultural and forest lands. The
envisioned goal is to help producers improve their practices for the betterment of the
environment as it relates to soil quality, water quality, air quality, wildlife habitat, and
greenhouse gas emissions (Claassen, 2016). The title was reworked in the 2014 farm bill
to consolidate 23 programs into 13 with the goal to reduce complexity and increase
utilization (USDA ERS, 2017). Conservation programs account for about 5.8 percent of
the $489 billion 2014 farm bill, which equates to about $28.17 billion over the fiscal year
2014-2018 period (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017).
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Conservation programs have been incorporated in the farm bill since its
beginning, specifically through the National Resources Conservation Service, formerly
known as the Soil Conservation Service. Enacted in 1935 through the Soil Conservation
Act, conservation programs worked to gain attention and popularity from farmers to
preserve the country’s natural resources (USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service,
n.d.). Technical assistance was the primary offering, until 1954 when project-based
assistance became the norm across the United States to conserve resources and
rehabilitate depleted sources. The turning point for conservation practices came during
the 1980’s farm crisis and the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was created. CRP,
in addition to other programs, created a more forceful emphasis on conservation and tied
participation in USDA programs to conservation practices (USDA Natural Resources
Conservation Service, n.d.). Conservation programs represent 6 percent of the total $489
billion 2014 farm bill over the 2014-2018 period, which is about $29.34 billion over the 5
year life span (USDA ERS, 2017).
Programs available in Title II: Conservation
Conservation programs are categorized as incentive programs intended to help
share the costs farmers would burden through the implementation or improvement of
conservation practices on an operation. According to United States Department of
Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS), “incentive programs can avoid
the inherent difficulties in regulating geographically diffuse and difficult to monitor
sources of pollution, and can minimize economic harm to farmers by offering a range of
incentives and assistance programs” (Claassen, 2016). The same source notes these
incentive programs are responsible for more than 95 percent of all USDA conservation
spending (Claassen, 2016). These programs are the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP), Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP), Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP), Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) (sometimes
referred to as the Conservation Security Program), Regional Conservation Partnership
Program (RCPP), and Conservation Technical Assistance (CTA).
CRP provides contracts between the United States Federal Government and
producers to take land out of agricultural production for 10 to 15 years. There is a large
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majority of CRP contracts that enroll whole fields or whole farms, but increased interest
in enrolling high-priority, partial-field practices has occurred more recently. These
would include filter strips and grass waterways rather than an entire farm or field
(Claassen, 2016). This program would be considered retiring land from production.
There is a competitive general sign-up period at select times as well as a continuous signup option that is less competitive but only offered to those who qualify. The 2014 farm
bill implemented a “step down” policy for the acreage cap allowed in CRP over the fiveyear life of the 2014 farm bill. The goal is to reduce acreage from 27.5 million acres in
FY 2014 to 24 million acres by FY 2018 (U.S. Senator Debbie Stabenow, Chairwoman,
2014).
EQIP provides cost-share assistance to farmers to adopt or install conservation
practices for land currently in agricultural production, otherwise known as working lands
(Claassen, 2016). It is a voluntary program with a requirement that 60 percent of funds
go to livestock producers (Farm Bureau 2018 Farm Bill, 2016). In addition, it provides
up to $80,000 to producers in a 6-year period working to meet National Organic Program
requirements and the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program (WHIP) was consolidated into
EQIP with a five percent required funding allocation (Farm Bureau 2018 Farm Bill,
2016).
CSP supports ongoing and new conservation improvements by producers who
work to meet stewardship requirements on working agricultural land. There must be a
demonstrated high level of stewardship to be eligible for the program, as well as intention
to further improve the environment’s performance over the life of the contract (Claassen,
2016). Contracts last up to ten years.
Title III: Trade
Post-World War II and post-Korean War conditions in agriculture created a need
to focus on trade. Technological advances were boosting crop yields and farms were
increasing productivity. At the same time, concerns were heightened with the fall off of
wartime demands and high, fixed loan rate policy. Demand could not keep up with
supply and the agricultural markets were flooded with surpluses. The first attempt to
handle the situation was to authorize the use of surplus commodities for foreign food aid
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and to help allies, which became known as Food for Peace and continues to serve this
way (Coppess, 2017).
Additionally, the Trade title was created to provide support for United States
agricultural exports. Two major avenues to do so are export market development
programs and export credit guarantees. Most of the programs associated with the Trade
title are funded as mandatory expenditures. The additional provisions included in the title
associate with World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations (Johnson & Monke, What Is
the Farm Bill?, 2017). The trade title accounts for four tenths of a percent share of the
2014 farm bill, which is about $1.5 billion in actual spending FY 14-16 and projected
spending FY 17-18 (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017).
Programs in Title III: Trade
Programs within the title primarily assist United States industry efforts to “build,
maintain, and expand overseas markets for U.S. agricultural products” (Johnson,
Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017). The Market Access Program is one of the largest
programs within the title, serving in USDA’s Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS), that
partners with agricultural groups to share the costs of overseas marketing and
promotional activities to help build commercial export markets. Additionally held within
FAS and the trade title is the Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP) that focuses
on generic promotion of United States commodities to build international demand; the
Emerging Markets Program (EMP) which provides technical assistance activity funding
to promote exports of United States agricultural commodities to worldwide emerging
markets; the Quality Samples Program (QSP) that helps provide samples of United States
agricultural products to potential customers abroad; and Technical Assistance for
Specialty Crops (TASC) with funds for projects that address sanitary, phytosanitary and
technical barriers, potentially or otherwise, threatening the export of United States
specialty crops (USDA FAS Programs, n.d.).
Among export credit programs, the Export Credit Guarantee Program,
administered by the appointed General Sales Manager official within FAS charged with
increasing exports and encouraging foreign countries to import United States farm
products, guarantees repayment for when United States banks extend credit to foreign
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banks in the financing of sales of United States agricultural products. There is also the
Facility Guarantee Program (FGP) that provides credit guarantees in supporting
infrastructure improvements to provide adequate facilities that accommodate demanded
United States agricultural products. The 2014 farm bill extended the above programs, but
made significant changes to comply with new restrictions that precipitated following the
WTO decision in a cotton case won by Brazil.
The 2014 farm bill also reauthorized international food aid programs that support
the domestic agricultural safety net, agricultural trade goals, and efforts to alleviate
hunger abroad. Two conditions of most United States international food assistance is be
(1) based on the donation of United States agricultural commodities for the distribution of
food or sale of food to generate funds for development programs and (2) shipped
primarily on U.S.–flag vessels. The U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and FAS are the primary implementation agencies. Food for Peace is held in
USAID. The 2014 farm bill did amend existing food aid law to put a larger emphasis on
improving the nutritional quality of food aid products. There is special attention in place
to ensure the sales of agricultural commodity donations do not disrupt local markets.
Similar local and regional procurement (LRP) programs were expanded from the 2008
farm bill pilot program for food distribution, as well as additional funding.
Overall, the biggest impact on the Trade title from the 2014 farm bill was the
directive to reorganize the international trade functions of USDA and establish an Under
Secretary for Farm and Foreign Agricultural Affairs within USDA. This position would
require Senate confirmation and has since been acted upon by the current administration,
with the appointment of Indiana State Department of Agriculture director, Ted
McKinney, fulfilling the inaugural duty, serving as the Under Secretary for Trade and
Foreign Agricultural Affairs.
Title IV: Nutrition
First created with the Food Stamp Act of 1964, the nutrition title has been a pillar
in farm bill discussions, representing primarily the urban voting population. There is
strategy in the farm bill when it comes to the nutrition title and commodity programs:
“support for the programs follows participation” (Kuethe & Coppess, Mapping the Fate
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of the Farm Bill: A Closer Look at SNAP, 2014). Since food stamps primarily benefit
urban populations while commodity programs primarily benefit rural populations, the
Congressional delegation representing the two facets tend to vote with their represented
population. The act of putting the nutrition title with the rest of the farm bill gathers
enough urban votes in support of the legislation to add to the political support for
commodity programs to pass together.
Food assistance policy has held its ground in the farm policy arena from the very
beginning. The first farm bill (AAA) provided for the distribution of surplus
commodities to low-income families in addition to the support provided for commodity
prices. The first food stamp program was created in 1939 by the Secretary of
Agriculture, Henry A. Wallace, by using surplus commodities to help low-income
families. That program ended during World War II in 1943. In the following years,
Congress authorized a food stamp pilot program through a foreign food aid
reauthorization bill in 1959. The administration at the time, President Eisenhower,
refused to implement said pilot program. And in 1961, during the President Kennedy
administration, USDA initiated a pilot food stamp program, but, it did not use surplus
commodities, like previous attempts. In 1964, the food stamp programs entered the
discussions, and altered the debate of farm bills moving forward by adding more drama.
All in all, the primary role of the nutrition title is to provide benefits to eligible
low-income households that can be used in exchange for eligible food purchases at
authorized retailers. It is the largest title of the farm bill, holding a 79.9 percent share of
the 2014 farm bill spending (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017). When the
2014 farm bill was enacted, economic projections anticipated the nutrition title to cost
just over $390 billion (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017). However, with an
improved economy, fewer people needed to rely on the program and the program has
saved nearly $26 billion in its first three years (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill,
2017).
Programs in Title IV: Nutrition
The Food Stamp Program became known as the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program in the 2008 Farm Bill and is the largest program in the farm bill
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assisting an average of 44.2 million individuals in 21.8 million households each month
(Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017). Eligibility and benefits for the program
are calculated on a household basis. Financial eligibility is determined through either a
traditional or a categorical eligibility path. Under traditional eligibility, households must
meet gross income, net income, and asset tests in the application process to become
eligible for SNAP benefits. Categorical eligibility is automatically granted based on the
applicant’s participation in other means-tested programs, such as Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), or General Assistance
(GA). A number of provisions in SNAP were altered to improve the program in the 2014
farm bill, specifically related to work programs for participants and stocking more fresh
foods that are SNAP eligible in retail stores.
Other programs include the Emergency Food Assistance Program which provides
USDA-purchased commodity foods to states to supplement other sources of food aid and
is often provided in food banks and homeless shelter projects as either food packages or
meals. Commodity Supplemental Food Program provides supplemental foods for
elderly persons eligible due to a low income level 130 percent below the federal poverty
income guidelines. The nutrition title also includes Programs in Lieu of SNAP, Senior
Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program, School and Institution Food Programs and
Community Food Projects; these are programs that additionally support access to
nutritional foods or encourage healthy food to meet nutrition and farm needs in
communities throughout the United States.
Title V: Credit
The Credit title of the farm bill has played an essential role in the continuation of
farm businesses. With the amount of risk associated with farming, there are few lending
options available to producers to cover the large expenses associated with farming
operations. The federal government can take on that risk. The credit title provides
lending opportunities that private commercial entities cannot offer. The authorities of the
credit-loan programs were first included in the farm bill in the 1990s (Farm Bill: A Short
History and Summary, n.d.). Only recently in the 2014 farm bill were provisions added
to help beginning farmers and ranchers.
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Programs in Title V: Credit
The USDA Farm Service Agency (FSA) is the agricultural lender with the
greatest connection to the federal government’s role in agricultural credit. With the
ability to issue direct loans to farmers who are unable to qualify for regular commercial
credit, it is considered a lender of last resort. It can also guarantee the repayment of
certain loans made by other lenders. There is a statutory mandate to target loans to
beginning farmers and socially disadvantaged groups.
Another lender with federal mandate is the Farm Credit System, which is
cooperatively owned and federally charted to serve only agriculture-related borrowers. It
is a private lender with a statutory mandate, and is not considered a lender of last resort.
Rather, it is a government-sponsored enterprise receiving tax benefits and other
preferences in return for restrictions on its lending base. Farmer Mac is the other private
entity with federal statute to provide a secondary market for agricultural loans. These
programs are considered permanent, but farm bills can make adjustments to modify
operations and eligibility criteria.
Title VI: Rural Development
The rural development title has held a spot in the farm bill since 1973 with the
purpose to create and support new competitive advantages in rural areas. By creating
these new advantages, the rural areas can better compete on a larger scale to attract
population and economic prosperity. In general, the rural development title provides
assistance for rural business creation and expansion, as well as rural infrastructure. A
current topic of discussion for the rural development title is the reorganization efforts by
current USDA Secretary Sonny Perdue, who changed the position of Deputy Under
Secretary for Rural Development, which was formerly Senate confirmed, to Assistant to
the Secretary for Rural Development, which is a direct-report to the USDA Secretary.
This reorganization is said by USDA to be an increased emphasis on Rural Development
in an effort to elevate Rural Development’s focus (United States Department of
Agriculture, 2017). The rural development title has $218 million dedicated to the
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programs it administers over the FY2014-FY 2018 period (Johnson, Previewing a 2018
Farm Bill, 2017).
Programs in Title VI: Rural Development
The rural development title has over 88 programs, housed in 16 different federal
agencies that each target rural economic development initiatives. With USDA as the lead
federal agency for rural development, it administers the largest amount of programs.
There are programs to assist rural communities in housing, electrical generation and
transmission, broadband, water, waste water, and economic and institutional capacity in
local communities. The Rural Electrification Act of 1936 is housed in the farm bill, as
well as rural utilities and infrastructure. The ConAct, as it is referred to, is part of the
rural development title to give authority to USDA to administer its lending and grant
programs. Rural Economic Development Grants are used to promote economic
development in rural areas and there are various additional programs like it to assist in
specialization and growth of rural communities. The 2014 farm bill modified the
definition of rural area to increase the maximum eligible population threshold for
assistance. Currently, there are four key areas of rural development focus: (1) broadband
and telecommunications, (2) rural water and wastewater infrastructure, (3) business and
community development, and (4) regional development. All areas are subject to
appropriations for discretionary spending. Recently, community health has entered the
realm of rural development, especially as the opioid crisis has intensified.
Title VII: Research
When the United States Department of Agriculture was created in 1862 by
President Lincoln, it was primarily charged to support agricultural research. Serving
technically as the oldest title of the farm bill, stemming from the Morrill Land Grant Act
of 1862, the purpose was to establish and fund research in land grant institutions in each
state. The mission of land-grant universities expanded through the Hatch Act of 1887 to
establish a series of agricultural experiment stations under the land-grant colleges. When
the Smith-Lever Act passed in 1914, it included cooperative extension so that university
research would be delivered directly to farmers in the field. Today, the breadth of the
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research title spans across a variety of topics, including agricultural production
techniques, organic and sustainable agriculture, bioenergy, nutrition needs and
composition, food safety, animal and plant health, pest and disease management,
economic decision making, and other social sciences affecting consumers, farmers, and
rural communities (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017). The research title
began appearing in farm bill reauthorizations in the 1990’s (Farm Bill: A Short History
and Summary, n.d.). It accounts for two tenths of a percent share of farm bill spending,
with a projected budget outlay, if fully funded over five years from the 2014 enactment,
to be $800 million (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017).
Programs in Title VII: Research
There are four agencies to implement USDA’s research and education actions.
They are grouped under the Research, Education, and Economics Mission Area, with its
own Senate confirmed Under Secretary. The Agricultural Research Service (ARS) is
USDA’s chief scientific in-house research agency working to find solutions to
agricultural problems from field to table. The National Institute of Food and Agriculture
(NIFA) provides leadership and funding for programs advancing agricultural-related
sciences by distributing federal funds to land-grant universities and outside partners for
research, education and extension activities. The Economic Research Service (ERS)
serves as the economic and social science research arm of USDA anticipating trends and
emerging issues in agriculture, food, the environment, and rural America to conduct highquality, objective economic research. The National Agricultural Statistics Service
(NASS) holds the primary role of conducting the Agricultural Census every five years
and providing official statistics on agricultural production and other relevant farm sector
indicators. The research title is subject to appropriations, but many programs were
granted mandatory spending, including the Specialty Crop Research Initiative, the
Organic Agricultural Research and Extension Initiative, and the Beginning Farmer and
Rancher Development Program. There were also funds granted in the 2014 farm bill to
establish the Foundation for Food and Agriculture Research, which is a nonprofit
corporation designed to accept private donations and award grants for collaborative
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public/private partnerships among USDA, academia, and the private sector (Johnson,
Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017).
Title VIII: Forestry
First created in the 2002 farm bill, the forestry title provides authority for the
United States Forest Service, which is the principal federal forest management agency.
With about one-third of the land area in the United States in forestland, the federal
government owns one-third, while the rest is owned by non-industrial private landowners
(Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017). Primarily these lands are to provide
wood for lumber, plywood, paper, and other materials. They also serve an ecological
purpose for recreation, clean water, wildlife habitat, and more. Funding for the forestry
title is about eight million dollars over five years (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill,
2017).
Programs in Title VIII: Forestry
The United States Forest Service administers the National Forest System, as well
as provides technical and financial assistance to nonfederal landowners. It also serves as a
research hub to develop the science of forestry, domestically and abroad. There is an
extension to engage in international forestry assistance, as well. Additional forestry
provisions and programs are housed in other farm bill titles, especially conservation, and
all programs related to forestry are subject to appropriations (Farm Bill: A Short History
and Summary, n.d.).
Title IX: Energy
Renewable energy, primarily ethanol and biodiesel production, was spurred
through the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which is not included in the farm bill.
However, it created interest in the development of farm bill programs regarding energy.
USDA renewable energy programs were created to incentivize the adoption of renewable
energy projects when it does not seem cost effective. These projects include solar, wind,
and anaerobic digesters. Over time, this title has developed to promoting renewable
power, biomass-based products, and bringing biomass-based fuel to market.

The energy
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title holds a tenth of a percent share of the farm bill, with anticipated spending levels,
pending appropriations, of $625 million dollars over the bill’s five-year life (Johnson,
Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017).
Programs in Title IX: Energy
There are a number of programs for renewable energy support outside the
purview of USDA and even with legislative origins outside of the usual Agriculture
Committees. When the 2002 farm bill included energy title provisions, it was charged to
authorize grants, loans, and loan guarantees to foster research on agriculture-based
renewable energy. This way the development risks were shared and the promotion to
adopt renewable energy systems could be spread across a multifaceted strategy. The
most prominent program, and usually the only congressionally funded one, is the Rural
Energy for America Program (REAP) through USDA Rural Development. REAP
provides guaranteed loan financing and grant funding to agricultural producers and small
rural businesses that are implementing renewable energy systems or are making
improvements to energy efficiencies in their businesses (United States Department of
Agriculture, n.d.).
Rural Development also carries out the Biobased Markets Program, the
Biorefinery, Renewable Chemical and Biobased product Manufacturing Assistance
Program, Repowering Assistance Program, and Bioenergy Program for Advanced
Biofuels. USDA FSA implements the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP), which
is for owners and operators of agricultural and non-industrial private forest land to get
financial assistance to establish, produce, and deliver biomass feedstocks, in addition to
the Feedstock Flexibility Program. The Biodiesel Fuel Education Program and the
Biomass Research and Development Initiative are housed in the USDA National Institute
of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) and the Department of Energy. The Community Wood
Energy Program is in USDA Forest Service. All programs are subject to appropriations,
with only a few of the programs having mandatory funding and those with discretionary
funding designations have not been appropriated in FY 2014-2016 (McMinimy, 2016).
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Title X: Horticulture
The Horticulture title is another newcomer to the farm bill scene, first included in
the 2008 farm bill. It was designated to specifically support specialty crops, certified
organic and local foods. The title came to fruition because producers of these sectors are
not eligible for support under the USDA farm commodity revenue support programs.
They are, however, eligible for other support programs throughout the farm bill, but this
title was created specifically to draw attention to the designated sector. The Horticulture
title represents specialty crops, which are “fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits,
and horticulture and nursery crops (including floriculture)”, agricultural products certified
as “USDA organic”, and a range of businesses considered to be engaged in local food
production (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017). Support for these sectors
represents two tenths of a percent of the farm bill, with an estimated total of $874 million
over five years (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017). In the 2014 farm bill,
there was increased demand to provide the title more mandatory funding that would
reinforce the purpose of the title and its role in representing the specific sector of
agriculture.
Programs in Title X: Horticulture
Some key programs included in the Horticulture title are the Specialty Crop Block
Grant Program (SCBGP) and the Specialty Crop Research Initiative (SCRI). The
Specialty Crop Block Grant Program distributes blocked grant money to each state in an
effort to enhance the competitiveness of specialty crops based on a set performance
evaluation standards for the project. The Specialty Crop Research Initiative was created
to enhance a focus on specialty crop research, especially pests and diseases like citrus
greening, and other threats to the specialty crop sector. There are also additional
provisions to assist with pest and disease prevention and nutrition programs that target
fruits and vegetables. There are a number of programs that cross with these products
through marketing and promotion programs, domestic food and nutrition programs,
research and cooperative extension programs, and conservation programs. However,
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these programs do not provide the direct support that the Horticulture title provides to
elevate the industry to expedite growth and economic health in the sectors and beyond.
Title XI: Crop Insurance
Title XI Crop Insurance provides new and continued insurance products for
producers to purchase in a public-private partnership. The insurance helps protect
producers against losses resulting from price and yield risks. The products are
administered by the United States Department of Agriculture Risk Management Agency
(USDA RMA), but are sold through private-sector insurance companies (USDA ERS,
2017).
The crop insurance program was permanently enacted by the Federal Crop
Insurance Act passed in 1938 and has been amended in each farm bill. In 1980, the
program saw a drastic reform to expand offerings and create more affordable options
through increased premium subsidies provided by the federal government. The years
1994 and 2000 also saw large modifications with the introduction of Catastrophic (CAT)
coverage and even larger increases in premium subsidies. Revenue insurance was
created to be part of the federal crop insurance program during the mid-1990’s and has
grown to be the most popular crop insurance product (O'Donoghue, Government
Programs & Risk, 2016).
In addition to federal crop insurance, disaster payments can be made on an
emergency basis, but only when administered through ad hoc approvals by United States
Congress (O'Donoghue, Government Programs & Risk, 2016). However, with the
expansion of the federal crop insurance program, many adjustments to the farm bill have
been made to incentivize utilization of crop revenue insurance rather than rely on disaster
payments.
The Congressional Research Service Report on Farm Safety Net Programs
indicates that more than 205 million acres in the United States are covered under the
federal crop insurance program. An annual 1.2 million policies are purchased by
producers (Shields, 2015). There are no subsidy limits within the crop insurance program
and all participants can be eligible regardless of income levels. Crop insurance represents
eight and a half percent of the total $489 billion 2014 farm bill. The January 2017
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projections estimate crop insurance costs to be just over $30 billion for FY 2014-2016
and into projected FY 2017 -2018 (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017).
Programs in Title XI: Crop Insurance
Within the traditional crop insurance program, there are two groups of plans to
choose from: yield insurance plans and revenue insurance plans. In both cases, producers
purchase policies at a subsidized rate, between 38-80 percent, and receive indemnity
payments based on current losses (Farm Bureau 2018 Farm Bill, 2016). Crop insurance
policies are administered by seventeen private Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs).
The premium rates (Table 1) are set by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC)
Board of Directors, with an average premium discount around 62 percent (Shields, 2015).
The insurance premiums and a portion of the private companies’ administrative and
operating costs, as well as shares in underwriting gains and losses with the companies,
are administered through the USDA RMA (USDA ERS, 2017). Producers sign up for
insurance prior to planting and pay the premium following harvest.

Table 1: Farmer Crop Insurance Premium Discount Schedule by Insurance Plan and
Deductible Coverage Level
Farmer Crop Insurance Premium Discount Schedule Percentage
Insurance Plan

Deductible Level Percentage
CAT

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

Basic & Optional Units

100

67

64

64

59

59

55

48

38

Enterprise Units

n/a

80

80

80

80

80

77

68

53

Area Yield Plans

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

59

59

55

55

Area Revenue Plans

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

59

55

55

49

Whole Farm Units

n/a

80

80

80

80

80

80

71

56

Source: (Farm Bureau 2018 Farm Bill, 2016)
Within the two plans available to producers, there are multiple products offered to
tailor insurance to each specific farm. In yield insurance, there is Actual Production
History (APH) coverage, Catastrophic (CAT) Risk Protection Endorsement coverage,
Area Risk Protection Insurance (ARPI) yield version, and Dollar Plan coverage (Cooper,
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O'Donoghue, & Hungerford, Crop Insurance Program Provisions-Title XI, 2017). And
revenue insurance, since its establishment, has been the most utilized form of insurance
for producers. There are four products available in these plans: Revenue Protection (RP),
Area Risk Protection Insurance (ARPI) on a revenue basis rather than yield, Whole-Farm
Revenue Protection (WFRP) and the Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) coverage.
Title XII: Miscellaneous, including NAP
The Miscellaneous title, as it is called, holds a variety of programs for the farm
bill, depending on the year. In most cases, these programs either do not have a “home
title” or are individual programs to address specific problems at the time of inception. In
the 2014 farm bill, the Miscellaneous title primarily focused on livestock issues and the
future of agriculture, including outreach to engage new farmers and support towards an
agricultural workforce.
Programs in Title XII: Miscellaneous
The miscellaneous title contained livestock provisions that reauthorized disease
programs and health plans in the National Animal Health Laboratory Network. The
sheep industry gained traction with its production and marketing grant program to
promote the industry. Over half of the United States has a feral swine problem and
eradication of feral swine was a pertinent issue, so a pilot program was created to
eradicate feral swine. By implementing a program like this, the risk of spreading disease
to other animals or humans is reduced.
The title also continued grants to organizations working with minority farmers in
their efforts to engage in agriculture, whether it was through acquiring, owning,
operating, or retaining farms and ranches. This was enhanced with the provision to
maintain an Office of Tribal Relations in the Office of the Secretary. There was also a
Military Veterans’ Agriculture Liaison created to help military veterans utilize USDA
programs in the industry. As far as the future of agriculture, the title continued the office
of advocacy and outreach as well as reauthorized the Agricultural Career and
Employment Grant Program to help develop skills and market information, as well as
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other details, in having an agricultural labor force (U.S. Senator Debbie Stabenow,
Chairwoman, 2014).
These programs are the current framework of farm policy legislation currently in
debate. These titles are the result of work done by Congressional Agriculture
Committees over the past century and provide insight into how those committee members
intended to help carry United States agriculture into the future. Having this information
about the farm bill titles will aid this thesis as it provides empirical information about the
farm bill and its role in the agricultural sector.
Primary Factors Affecting the Farm Bill
In an empirical analysis of the farm bill, it is essential to not only have the
information about the farm bill, but to also learn about the factors surrounding the farm
bill. There are the specific programs encompassed in the farm bill, but in the peripheral,
there are other factors influencing the development and execution of a farm bill. The
following section explains the primary factors continually affecting the farm bill.
The Farm Economy
The farm economy directly affects the construction of a new farm bill each and
every time it is written. The farm bill’s origin comes from a time of poor market
conditions and depressed prices. When the farm economy is doing well and farm sector
income is trending upward, some farm bill opponents say agriculture does not need as
much support as in prior years. But not all times are good, and, during a 5-year life of a
farm bill, a number of factors can pivot the economy downward. The tightened margins
and depleted cash flow create financial dilemmas most farmers work diligently to avoid,
but can never predict. The farm bill is available to mitigate the risk to farmers during
times of hardship.
Put plainly, agricultural policy tries to mitigate the boom and bust cycle of the
agricultural economy. This tends to inflate the political dynamics that shape the farm
bill. The general way to describe the farm economy, as Boynton does is (1990):
If (supply exceeds demand)
THEN (prices fall quickly)
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IF (prices fall quickly)
THEN (farmers will stop planting this crop)
IF (farmers will stop planting this crop)
THEN (demand exceeds supply)
IF (demand exceeds supply)
THEN (prices rise quickly)
IF (prices rise quickly)
THEN (farmers will rush to plant)
IF (farmers will rush to plant)
THEN (supply exceeds demand)
Using this model of understanding, the farm bill works to combat these
conditions, and constantly strives to find the equilibrium point. There is no expectation
to “fix” the cycle of boom and bust, but rather help farmers mitigate the conditions to
survive. The goal is always the same: protect farm income and improve the conditions
for farmers through the cycle. The way the goal is accomplished largely depends on the
current state of agriculture. Not every part of agriculture experiences boom and bust in
synchronization, so farm policy has to take it all into consideration, and many times
specific commodities of agriculture, in the cycle. This idea is illustrated in Boynton’s
cognitive model of thinking for the way agricultural policy is shaped (1990):
IF the goal is…
And the state of agriculture is…
THEN…
The 2014 farm bill is an example of a farm bill written in a boom-stage of
agriculture. From 2010 to 2014, conditions were primed for agricultural exports to
expand and drive the prices of commodities upward. This increased farm income to
record levels and increased land values. Since then, the market has readjusted. The
United States is producing record level harvests while international demand has
plateaued. These conflictions have pressured commodity prices lower, bringing down
farm incomes and asset values with it. Many producers have turned to increasing debt in
order to cope, which has also raised debt-to-asset ratios. Lower net farm income is
expected to continue to decrease to levels previously seen in the early 2000’s just as the
next farm bill is to be written. The needs of American agriculture have drastically shifted
in the 5-year lifespan of the most recent farm bill. Farm income, as shown in Figure 1

28
provided by USDA ERS, is down 46% and is projected to fall another 8% by the end of
2017 (USDA ERS Farm Income Wealth).

Figure 1: Net farm income and net cash farm income, 2000-2017F
(USDA ERS Farm Income Wealth)
Each time a farm bill is written, it is molded around its economic environment
and with bleak times predicted ahead, it is expected that farm bill programs will be called
upon to alleviate the risks associated with poor market conditions. As always,
agricultural economic well-being will be the result of crop harvests and associated prices
along with the macroeconomic factors working domestically and abroad. But the farm
sector will pay attention to the relief opportunity the farm bill could provide as it was
intended to do.
The Budget
The United States Federal Budget is a primary factor affecting any farm bill
because you can only spend money that is available and budgeted. The budget “baseline”
is used to project spending levels. The baseline is determined by the Congressional
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Budget Office (CBO) and it is a projection at a snapshot in time of what spending on
mandatory programs would be if current law were to remain. There are two main
baselines used: the January and the June baseline. When a change to a bill is proposed, it
is “scored” against the baseline as a benchmark to measure impact of the change in
relation to the baseline. Changes that increase spending relative to the baseline have a
positive score, while changes that decrease spending compared to the baseline have a
negative score. Reductions from the baseline, if they occur, can be used to offset other
provision changes or reduce the budget deficit.
There have been a number of attacks to agricultural support programs from many
high-profile Congressional members, Administration officials and special interest groups.
Most notably was President Trump’s proposed budget in early 2017 that targeted key
farm bill programs. The proposal called for a reduction of $16.2 billion from a number of
policy mechanisms. It called for a cap to crop insurance premium subsidies to be set at
$40,000. In addition, adjusted gross income (AGI) levels are altered to cap at $500,000,
down from the current cap of $900,000, which only applies to commodity program
eligibility. The president’s proposal would have also applied the AGI cap to both
commodity and crop insurance eligibility. Finally, the proposed budget called for the
elimination of the Harvest Price Option in crop insurance (Executive Office of the
President of the United States, 2017). Further cuts were seen in conservation programs,
primarily in technical assistance. Rural Economic Development grants were targeted for
elimination, as well. The budget proposal defined some USDA programs as having “no
federal purpose”, including the Market Access Program, the Foreign Market
Development Program, the Biomass Crop Assistance Program, and the Specialty Crop
Block Grants (Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2017).
Fueling the fire of farm bill debates has been the deficit reduction environment in
which the past few farm bills have been written under. “Political dynamics concerning
sequestration and broader deficit reduction goals leave open difficult questions about how
much and when the farm bill budget may be reduced” (Johnson & Monke, WHAT IS
THE FARM BILL?*, 2013). This creates difficult decisions in Congress to decide how
much total support to provide to agriculture and how to allocate that support among
competing constituencies.
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The Nutrition Title
Another primary factor affecting farm bill is the question: is it a farm bill or a
food bill? The nutrition title has asserted itself as the most expensive title in the farm bill,
dominating almost 80% of the bill’s spending. It is a program utilized by impoverished
people who cannot afford to buy food in times of difficulty. As part of the welfare
program portfolio, it takes a large amount of criticism for its spending levels. With its
political history, the food stamps bill has been used as a pawn in decades of political
debate. The most recent example is the 2014 farm bill, or what was supposed to be the
2012 farm bill. In the political climate of deficit cuts, there was the rise of the
conservative caucus known as the Freedom Caucus. The strategy was to split food
stamps from the farm bill in order to make deep spending cuts to both titles. The plan
was only successful in the House, after the bill was extended following its expiration in
September of 2012. In the 2013 debates, the House failed to pass the bill together, but
eventually passed the two bills individually. When both bills went to conference
committee with the Senate, the Senate conferees put the two bills back together to pass a
single omnibus. Many wonder if this will happen again for the next farm bill as Congress
faces similar deficit cuts and the Freedom Caucus continues its agenda to dramatically
reduce government spending levels.
Farm Bill Politics
When one first thinks about politics, the usual response involves the polarized
views of the belief spectrum stretched across liberalism to conservatism. Every humanbeing falls somewhere on the spectrum, holding beliefs molded by circumstances varying
from demographics to family to education and even wealth. When it comes to the farm
bill, there is a different kind of politics at play. The farm bill is not a strict partisan split
between republicans and democrats. Some democrats resonate with the food stamps
portion in their welfare agenda to take care of constituents, while other democrats
resonate most with the commodity programs of their state’s constituents. Some
republicans have been in favor of the government subsidy programs in support of farming
constituents, while others advocate to move the programs to free-market practices. The
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farm bill plays less “R versus D” game and finds geography to be a larger factor. From
the Traditional Farm Coalition, corn is in the Midwest, cotton is in the South, and wheat
is in the Great Plains (Coppess & Kuethe, Mapping the Farm Bill: the Traditional Farm
Coalition and Current Production, 2016). The Expanded Traditional Farm Coalition
includes soybeans with corn in the Midwest, peanuts with cotton in the South, and rice in
the Mississippi Delta region (Coppess & Kuethe, Mapping the Farm Bill: Expanding the
Traditional Farm Coalition, 2016). The farm coalition, by nature, splits itself along
regional lines (Coppess, Reviewing Farm Bill History: the Agricultural Act of 1954,
2017).
These geographical distinctions are seen much more easily on a map. Farmdoc
daily mapped production information using the Major World Crop Areas and Climate
Profiles information to identify the largest possible political footprint of each farm
commodity production area shown in Figure 2. Using the 114th Congressional districts, a
district that contains some portion of a major crop producing county is highlighted. This
represents the potential political reach of each commodity, but not necessarily the
political influence. Using these maps, there are “533 counties classified by USDA as
major corn producers [that] intersect 82 Congressional districts… 148 major cotton
producing counties [that] intersect with 38 Congressional districts; winter and spring
wheat consist of 411 and 84 counties that intersect 91 and 7 Congressional districts,
respectively” (Coppess & Kuethe, Mapping the Farm Bill: the Traditional Farm Coalition
and Current Production, 2016). Best case scenario would have all Congressional districts
that are highlighted vote “yay” a farm only bill to barely pass out of the House of
Representatives. This assumes there is no overlap of districts and each commodity agrees
at the debate table. History of the farm bill says otherwise and that commodities have a
rapport of infighting among farm bill debates. When the Extended Farm Coalition is
included in Figure 3, overlap occurs and “yay” votes are even further unreliable. Specific
commodity representation is displayed in Figures 4-10.

32

Figure 2: Mapping the Farm Bill – Traditional Farm Coalition

Figure 3: Mapping the Farm Bill – The Expanded Farm Bill Coalition
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Figure 4: Congressional Districts Representing High-Density Corn Production

Figure 5: Congressional Districts Representing High-Density Soybean Production
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Figure 6: Congressional Districts Representing High-Density Winter Wheat Production

Figure 7: Congressional Districts Representing High-Density Spring Wheat Production
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Figure 8: Congressional Districts Representing High-Density Peanut Production

Figure 9: Congressional Districts Representing High-Density Rice Production
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Figure 10: Congressional Districts Representing High-Density Cotton Production
What pits the farm coalition against itself? Historic ideology regarding farm
policy. In debates towards a 1954 farm bill, the farm coalition was split on policy during
post-World War II times. The South and Great Plains wanted to keep high, fixed loan
rates at 90% parity, which were established during the war. However, Midwestern
farmers wanted to end the high, fixed loan rates, as well as the acreage controls that had
been established to make the programs more market-oriented (Coppess, Reviewing Farm
Bill History: the Agricultural Act of 1954, 2017). Each time a farm bill is written, the
debate continues and commodity programs are manipulated to accommodate the wishes
of the commodities in power. The 2014 farm bill created the ARC-CO program which
uses a flexible parity program, similar to what the Midwest wanted in 1954, and is
primarily favored by Midwestern crops. The Southern states favor the PLC program that
uses fixed reference prices, similar to the 90% parity guarantee of 1954, and debated long
with the Midwest about which commodity programs to support.
Because of the unsteadiness of the farm coalition to get enough “yay” votes, the
farm bill supporting coalition has broadened tremendously. The farm bill has a way of
bringing the most unlikely allies together at one table to pit groups against friends. The
omnibus procedure has been the primary avenue to pass a farm bill because it provides
the opportunity for as much backing of the bill as possible (Jones, 1961). A new
understanding to the farm bill debates is that a farm bill cannot solely exist without the

37
expectation that farmers protect the environment, so environmental groups have laid
stake to the legislation. Additionally, the rural/urban coalition has tied food assistance
programs to the farm bill and is central to the political economy of future farm bills
(Orden & Zulauf, 2015). And, since its inception, the farm bill has brought more and
more representative parties to the debate table, including national farm groups,
commodity associations, state organizations, nutrition and public health officials, and a
variety of advocacy groups representing conservation, recreation, rural development,
local food systems, and certified organic production.
Coalition politics are incredibly important in the farm bill discussion. When the
coalition is not standing together, they can be pitted against each other to make bigger
spending cuts, just as they were most recently in the 2014 farm bill debate and in debates
prior. Then it becomes a lose-lose for farm bill stakeholders. Each coalition member is
seeking to protect its own interests, but “a functioning coalition is necessary to pass a
farm bill,” no matter the party lines (Coppess, Reviewing Farm Bill History: Budgets,
Boll Weevils and the 1981 Farm Bill, 2017).
Data Observations
When discussions begin about the upcoming farm bill, there is an expectation to
assess and evaluate how the farm bill has performed thus far (Boynton, 1990). So how
has the farm bill actually worked? The following data observations display the
quantitative research conducted for this thesis to formulate general ideas of what the farm
bill has done. This is done to capture an overall perspective of how the farm bill has
worked for each state and what is valued most based on the data. By taking this look, the
research question was created, and the hypotheses formulated have more context.
The farm bill in concept is simple. The idea is that when revenues are low, the
farm bill safety net helps alleviate the pressures of a tightened margin. The first graph of
this section, Figure 11 looks at a breakdown of the farm income statement. The cash
receipts (revenues) and expenses are accounted for, and the amount of government
program assistance fills the gap. In this income breakdown, cash receipts to expenses do
not break even at the 50% line where the cash receipts and expenses would be equitably
allocated. Few states are able to break even, and some are only able to do so with the
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addition of government program assistance to meet that breakeven benchmark. In some
cases, the government assistance helps, like in Oklahoma, where crop disaster is common
and the assistance provided recovered the margin over 15%. But the overall impression
is that farmers are not taking advantage of the assistance provided by the farm bill, as
some critics have argued, especially in good times as 2014 was said to be. In 2014 farm
incomes, expenses dominated a farmer’s financial condition, and while government
program payments relieved some of the pressures of tight margins in some states, farm
revenues were not enough to break even at 50%. How has the farm bill been used in the
states if it has not quite mitigated the pressures of tightening margins?

2014 Farm Income Percentage Breakdown
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Figure 11: 2014 Farm Income Statements, Broken Down by Percentage of Income in Revenues, Expenses, and Federal Government Payments
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(Farm Income Team, 2017)
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Figure 12 ranks the top fifteen states from 1995-2014 in their use of the farm bill.
The dollar figures include the sum of commodity programs, crop insurance, conservation,
and ad hoc disaster dollars. Texas and Iowa are ranked significantly above the other
states in amount of dollars spent on the individual states. These are two of the largest
agriculture production states. According to the sum and average commodity cash receipts
from 1995-2014, Texas is ranked 3rd and Iowa is 2nd in agriculture commodity cash
receipts. Illinois, Minnesota and Kansas are all moderately the same in USDA subsidy
use over the last 10 years. Each ranks 6th, 5th, and 7th, respectively, in commodity cash
receipts. The states to follow, such as North and South Dakota and Arkansas, do not
follow similar patterns of cash receipt levels (22nd, 17th, and 12th, respectively). It begs
the question if farm program payments are not corresponding with money generated from
the farms sequentially, what is driving farm program payments.
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Figure 12: Total USDA Subsidies by State Rank 1995-2014
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
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A more specific look at 2014 paints a slightly different story in Figure 13 and
could even allude to the debates leading up to the 2014 farm bill. With the political
drama that occurred, not to mention the political interests that surface with each farm bill
debate, different and even unexpected states find themselves higher in ranking. How do
Georgia and Colorado move up in rankings for a single year? Texas still rises to the top,
but the underlying factors built into a farm bill discussion are the topics of discussion for
this analysis. How do farm program payments get to the states? This calls for a
breakdown of what exactly entails the dollars in the ranking. Figure 14 stacks the
categories across all fifty states. Like the farms’ income statement, the government
payment diversity is just as unique among states as state are in their agriculture
production. Disaster dollars play a significant role in the totals of some states, while
others hold crop insurance above all else in terms of the payments those producers in the
state would prefer.
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Figure 13: Total USDA Subsidies by State Rank 2014
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)

$0
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Dollars(Millions)

2014 Farm Subsidy Dollars

$1,800

$1,600

$1,400

$1,200

$1,000

$800

$600

$400

$200

Conservation Dollars
Disaster Dollars
Commodity Dollars
Crop Insurance Dollars
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In the data specifically used for the analysis, Figure 15 displays the 2008 farm bill
estimates of all farm program payments across all states, but ranks the states by largest
number of operators to smallest according to the 2007 Agriculture Census. This displays
the amount of money over the 6-year period up to the 2014 farm bill. There is not the
expected consistency in the payments one would expect in the number of operators and
the payments. Based on the previous observations, we would expect Texas to lead in the
number of operators and be consistent with the government payments allocated to the
state. However, Missouri is the next state with the second largest number of operators
from the census. But Iowa receives significantly more government support with fewer
operators. North Dakota and South Dakota display a unique observation as they hold a
much smaller number of operators, but are ranked in the top ten in amount of government
programs allocated to both states. Oklahoma, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania are also
extremely unique. Though they have a strong farmer operator presence, they are
significantly lower in the money they receive in government programs.
An additional perspective comes in Figure 16 as the farm bill from 2014 onward
is displayed. As discussed in the history of farm bills, they are evolving as years continue
to produce legislation that help mitigate the risks of agricultural markets, rather than rely
on the government for consistency. However, again, the trend of government payments
is not consistent with the number of operators in the state, even after updating figures in
the census using the 2012 Agriculture Census.
And the final figure of this section, Figure 17, narrowly defines what each of
those government payments consist of in the same ranking order. This shows which
programs define the states’ use of farmer program payments. Direct farm payments are
significant in states with higher amounts of money, especially Iowa, Minnesota, and
Nebraska. Other states, like the Dakotas and Illinois seem to use farm bill money
towards crop insurance subsidies. Indemnities will vary across the states based on
weather and natural disasters that may have occurred in the state or region. Obviously,
according to this breakdown, each state has different interests when it comes to farm
payments in the farm bill, so what factors drive these results on behalf of the states’
interest? The analysis aims to answer that question.
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Figure 15: Farm Program Payments Sorted Largest to Smallest by 2007 Number of Farm Operators
(Risk Management Agency, 2017) (United States Department of Agriculture, 2009) (Farm Income Team, 2017)
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Figure 16: Farm Program Payments Sorted Largest to Smallest by 2012 Number of Farm Operators
(Risk Management Agency, 2017) (United States Department of Agriculture, 2014) (Farm Income Team, 2017)
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Figure 17: Farm Program Payments Sorted Largest to Smallest by Number of Farm Operators, 2015
(Risk Management Agency, 2017) (United States Department of Agriculture, 2014) (Farm Income Team, 2017)
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CHAPTER 2: AN EXAMPLE FROM INDIANA

As displayed in the data observation chapter, each state utilizes the farm bill
differently and for a better way to understand the impact the farm bill has on a state, an
example from Indiana will be used. Indiana is very reliant on production agriculture. In
2016, Indiana ranked 11th in overall state commodity cash receipts in the United States
(Farm Income Team, 2017). Indiana’s top five products are corn, soybeans, hogs, dairy
products (milk), and turkeys (Farm Income Team, 2017). Indiana covers 14.7 million
acres of farmland across 58,000 farms (Farm Income Team, 2017). These snapshots of
Indiana’s utilization of the farm bill using the most current data will provide a better
explanation for the information shared in the background. The following information
provides a producer opinion survey, data research and graphical explanations of the way
the farm bill has operated in Indiana for its primary farm programs.
Indiana Farmer Opinion Survey of the Farm Bill
In order to gain insight into what the state constituency holds most important in
the farm bill, a survey of Indiana farmers was done. When legislation important to
farmers is being debated, as in the farm bill, the constituency influence and electoral
incentives are held up to a higher level of consideration by legislators over other factors
such as legislator preferences, party affiliation, lobbying or political contributions (Jones,
1961) (Bellemare & Carnes, 2014). To understand what a constituency prefers, a survey
was conducted to assess producer interests in the farm bill programs. Indiana Farm
Bureau, Inc. coordinated the survey and distributed it, accordingly.
Indiana Farm Bureau, Inc. is Indiana’s largest general farm organization, founded
in 1919, and is a non-governmental, non-partisan organization that works to effectively
advocate for farmers to promote agriculture and improve the economic and social welfare
of its more than 258,000 member families. The organization is member-driven with a
grassroots governing structure that works from the county-level up to the national
organizations, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF). To be a member of
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Indiana Farm Bureau, Inc., one must pay a fee of $32.50 and, in general, be involved in
production agriculture or be retired from the profession.
At the direction of the AFBF, an electronic survey was to be distributed to a
sample of Indiana farmers for their opinions regarding topics in the Agricultural Act of
2014. With preparations for the 2018 farm bill discussions beginning, it was important to
understand the current landscape and functionality of the 2014 farm bill before discussing
improvements. By sampling farmers on key issues, as researched by academic and
industry experts, including Mary Kay Thatcher and Dr. John Newton, the scope of the
farm bill could be better grasped for this thesis. In addition, the survey results were used
for additional research initiatives as framework to set farm bill priorities and create
resources to farmers regarding the topic.
On October 13, 2016 a survey was emailed to over 26,000 members from the
Indiana Farm Bureau, Inc. membership database system through a data management
system, VoterVoice. VoterVoice is a FiscalNote Company that specializes in grassroots
advocacy systems with tools to enhance governmental affairs needs, including online
surveys. The 50-question survey was written by the AFBF and contained questions
related to general concepts of the farm bill, as well as a few specific program questions.
Some questions asked for a multiple-choice response, while others asked for specific
feedback. There were many closed-ended questions and some questions that asked
respondents to rank the given items. Survey recipients were provided notice that the
survey was for informational purposes only. The survey was intended to provide
information about Indiana Farm Bureau members’ opinions regarding the 2014 farm bill,
as well as what additional information they needed in order to prepare for upcoming
discussions for the 2018 farm bill.
The survey received 182 responses over a period of 63 days. One of the most
important questions asked on the survey was question two: If there will be less money in
the budget baseline for the next Farm Bill, prioritization of funding will be important.
Please rank your top five Farm Bill titles in order of importance with #1 being the most
important. The respondents’ results are listed in Appendix 1.
Table 2 with the popular voting percentage listed. This response focused Indiana
farmers’ priorities and set the framework for research to analyze why those programs
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were ranked of highest priority. Indiana farmers ranked three priorities: crop insurance,
conservation and the ARC-CO commodity program. Given the responses to the survey,
the research following the survey aimed to provide explanation of the respondents’ top
three priorities through data and literature. In addition, options looking ahead of how to
possibly improve the three programs were also considered. The complete survey results
can be found in Appendix 1.
Table 2: Results to survey question number 2 of the Indiana Farm Bureau Farm Bill
Survey
Item Ranked

Percentage

Crop Insurance

14.22%

Conservation Programs

12.44%

Commodity Program ARC-CO

12.31%

Trade

9.63%

Research and Extension

8.57%

Rural Development

7.47%

Energy
Miscellaneous (beginning farmers/ranchers programs, livestock health,
etc.)

7.01%

Nutrition

4.61%

Commodity Program PLC

4.49%

Commodity Program ARC-IC

3.43%

Credit

3.09%

Dairy MPP

2.84%

Forestry

2.32%

Specialty Crops
Source: (Indiana Farm Bureau, Inc., 2016)

5.56%

2.01%

These three titles (crop insurance, commodity programs and conservation
programs) are priority farm bill programs of Indiana producers according to the survey.
To confirm their opinions, additional research was collected through data specific to
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Indiana to coincide with the survey. The following portions are the results of the data
research.
Indiana Title XI: Crop Insurance
With a number of options available to producers in the United States, it is fairly
clear as to why, in the heart of the Corn Belt, Indiana producers find crop insurance to be
a number one priority in the upcoming farm bill debate. Research evidence shows
similar prioritization as the survey data. Though the amount of federal money spent in
Indiana is on the decline over the eight-year period, most likely due to federal budget
constraints, the largest category in which federal money is spent is crop insurance. When
the 2014 farm bill was passed, it was done with the intention to move producers away
from commodity program payments towards crop insurance products. This was done
with the elimination of direct payments and counter-cyclical payments in Title I
Commodities (USDA ERS, 2017). This may explain the sharp decrease in commodity
dollars seen in Figure 18, as well as maybe explains why crop insurance does not decline
as sharply.

Indiana Farm Subsidy Dollars by category,
2006-2014
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Figure 18: Indiana Farm Subsidy Dollars 2006-2014 by Program Category
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
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Over time, Indiana has followed the intended trend to make crop insurance the
largest utilized federal farm program by producers. Figure 19 shows this trend more
defiantly through a percentage stacked column chart 2006 through 2014. Crop insurance
started as less than 20 percent of money given in 2006 and has grown to over 70 percent
of the farm program money received by Indiana producers. This percentage of money is
the assistance producers are getting in paying for crop insurance, as well as any
indemnity payments that would have taken place in a given year.

Indiana Farm Subsidy Dollars by category,
2006-2014
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Figure 19: Percentage of Indiana Farm Subsidy Dollars 2006-2014 by Program Category
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)

A similar trend of dollars to Indiana is seen in the number of Indiana recipients by
category in Figure 20. Crop insurance policy holders made up nearly 40 percent of farm
subsidy recipients in Indiana in 2006, but a dramatic increase has occurred to almost 70
percent of recipients in 2014. As mentioned, the movement away from commodity
programs may be seen most notably in Figure 19 and Figure 20 as the percentage of
commodity dollars and recipients dwindled down to barely 1 percent.
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Indiana Farm Subsidy Recipients by
category, 2006-2014
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Figure 20: Percentage of Indiana Farm Subsidy Recipients 2006-2014 by Program
Category
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
Looking at the most recent data from 2014, Indiana has a substantial focus on
crop insurance, especially in comparison to other farm programs. With 74 percent of
total farm subsidy dollars in Indiana going towards crop insurance, it may explain why
Indiana farmers would rank crop insurance as a number one priority for future farm
policy. Figure 21 shows specifically the make-up of subsidy dollars by category and
Figure 22 elaborates on the number of recipients getting assistance in farm subsidies.
Again, crop insurance is leading the way in the amount of money spent in Indiana. It is
important to note regarding the program that the dollars show subsidies and indemnities
to farmers. This is why Figure 21 and Figure 22 do not show a $1 for one recipient ratio.
Additionally, producers buying crop insurance at different buy-up levels will cause the
premium discount subsidy to fluctuate from person to person.

53

Indiana Total Farm Subsidy Dollars, 2014
Conservation
Dollars
14%
Disaster Dollars
11%
Commodity Dollars
1%

Crop Insurance
Dollars
74%

Figure 21: Total Indiana Farm Subsidy Dollars in 2014 by Program Category
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)

Indiana Total Farm Subsidy Recipients, 2014

Conservation
Recipients
21%

Crop Insurance
Policies
69%

Disaster Recipients
7%
Commodity
Recipients
3%

Figure 22: Total Indiana Farm Subsidy Recipients in 2014 by Program Category
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
In Figure 23, Indiana’s subsidy dollars are compared to the rest of the United States.
Often, Indiana is associated as an “I-state”, combined with Illinois and Iowa, especially
when talking about agriculture, soil types, and weather conditions. However, one of the
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biggest unforeseen comparisons is how much lower in total dollars and overall farm
program category spending Indiana has compared to Iowa and Illinois. One factor to
consider in these comparisons may be square acreage covered by working agriculture
land, which may explain why Texas leads the United States in total farm subsidy dollars,
as well as the number of farms in the state. One of the possible outliers in the data set to
consider, as well, when making comparisons is the money spent in disaster dollars, such
as in Oklahoma, Nebraska, and Kansas.
Figure 24 takes a further look at the distribution of funds by category as a
percentage of the total amount of farm subsidy dollars by state. This figure shows the
emphasized importance of crop insurance in a number of states besides Indiana during
2014. A total of 21 states utilize the crop insurance program enough to reach over 50
percent of total farm subsidy dollars spent in the state. Disaster payments also cover a
large portion of many states’ total farm subsidy allocation.
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(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
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Figure 23: Total United States Farm Subsidy Dollars in 2014 by Program Category and State
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(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
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Figure 24: Percentage of Total United States Farm Subsidy Dollars in 2014 by Program Category and State
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Figure 25 shows the in-depth breakdown of what the farm program payment
outlays are in Indiana, as well as what funding levels have looked like across five farm
bills. Most important to note from this snapshot of the most recent years’ farm bills is
that crop insurance works when it is needed. The sharp peak in 2012 is in response to a
severe drought experienced throughout the Midwest. Additionally, the efforts to decrease
and modernize the direct farm program payments, such as target pricing and direct
payments, are obvious in the outlays. The line is one of the most volatile lines displayed,
but it has the most obvious dip between 2013 and 2014 when some of the most major
reforms to the Commodity Title occurred. CRP acres have decreased over the course of
time, implying more acres have been put back into production or funding is tight while
sign up periods are heavily competitive. Overall, it can be inferred from the outlays that
Indiana uses the farm bill when it is needed in order to combat the volatility of farming.
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Figure 25: Outlays of Primary Indiana Farm Bill Uses
(Farm Income Team, 2017) (Risk Management Agency, 2017) (Farm Service Agency,
2016)
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Indiana Title I: Commodity Programs
Indiana’s focus on commodity programs is primarily on the ARC-CO program for
the 2014 farm bill. This is because it is the state’s most used program in the title. As
Table 3 shows, the majority of the farms and acres in Indiana were enrolled in the ARCCO program, regardless of the crop, except for canola, which represents a very small
portion of Indiana’s agricultural production (USDA FSA, 2016). The ARC-CO has
provided inconsistent payments to the state of Indiana since the 2014 farm bill was
passed, which has created issues to be addressed in the next farm bill debate. The
following maps provided show the inconsistency across the state’s counties in the
payments received for the three primary crops: corn, soybeans, and wheat (See Figures
25-33).
Table 3 Percent of Indiana Farms and Indiana Base Acres in ARC/PLC Election by Crop

State

Percent of Farms and Base Acres that Made an ARC/PLC Election -- By State and
Crop
Percent of Farms
Percent of
Electing …
Bases Electing …
Covered
Commodity
ARC- ARC
ARC- ARC
PLC
Total PLC
Total
CO
-IC
CO
-IC

INDIANA

BARLEY

9%

91%

0%

100%

20%

80%

1%

100%

INDIANA

CANOLA

100%

0%

0%

100%

100%

0%

0%

100%

INDIANA

CORN

2%

98%

0%

100%

2%

98%

0%

100%

INDIANA

GRAIN
SORGHUM

4%

96%

0%

100%

7%

92%

1%

100%

INDIANA

OATS

4%

96%

0%

100%

3%

97%

0%

100%

INDIANA

SOYBEANS

2%

98%

0%

100%

2%

98%

0%

100%

INDIANA

SUNFLOWERS

0%

100%

0%

100%

0%

100%

0%

100%

INDIANA

WHEAT

6%

94%

0%

100%

8%

92%

0%

100%

(USDA Farm Service Agency, 2015)
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Figure 26: 2014 Indiana ARC-CO Corn Payment Rate by County

Figure 27: 2015 Indiana ARC-CO Corn Payment Rate by County
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Figure 28: 2016 Indiana ARC-CO Corn Payment Rate by County

Figure 29: 2014 Indiana ARC-CO Soybean Payment Rate by County
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Figure 30: 2015 Indiana ARC-CO Soybean Payment Rate by County

Figure 31: 2016 Indiana ARC-CO Soybean Payment Rate by County
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Figure 32: 2014 Indiana ARC-CO Wheat Payment Rate by County

Figure 33: 2015 Indiana ARC-CO Wheat Payment Rate by County
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Figure 34: 2016 Indiana ARC-CO Wheat Payment Rate by County
Indiana Title II: Conservation Programs
In terms of Conservation programs, the concern is less about inconsistency across
the state, like in commodity programs, and more about the limitations of the CRP
program and how to transition to other conservation programs available while in
economic times of financial limitations. Figure 18 shows a stagnant hold in conservation
dollars coming to Indiana, while Figure 19 shows conservation dollars to represent less
than 15 percent of the total amount of farm subsidy dollars in Indiana, with about 20
percent of the total recipients receiving conservation assistance, shown in Figure 20.
Overall, in 2014, Figure 21 shows conservation to represent 14 percent of the total farm
subsidy dollars. In comparison to other states,
Figure 23 shows the comparison of conservation dollars across states, with
Indiana low, once again, compared to the “I-states”. In the percentage breakdown of
Figure 24, 19 states use conservation dollars as a larger percentage of total farm subsidy
dollars than Indiana, inferring those states would put a higher priority on conservation

64
than Indiana. Figure 35 shows the large priority Indiana puts on CRP over the course of
four farm bills as it represents 86 percent of all conservation programs available.

Conservation Payments by Program in
Wildlife Habitat
Total Conservation
Indiana from 1995-2014 Incentives
Program
Security Program
Wetlands Reserve4%
Program
1%

Emergency
Conservation
1%

Grasslands Reserve
Program
0%

(WHIP)
0%
Agricultural
Conservation Program
1%

Misc. Conservation
Payments
0%

Env. Quality Incentive
Program
7%

Conservation Reserve
Program
86%

Figure 35: Total Indiana Conservation Program Payments 1995-2014 by Program
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
Figure 36 dives deeper to look at the payments in relation to the acreage enrolled
in CRP from 1997 through 2015. Indiana has seen a dramatic increase over this time
period in funding for conservation programs, however in the past four years, a nearly
matching decrease has followed. In comparison, CRP acreage saw its highest peak at the
beginning of the period with general decreases over time, ending the period in its lowest
point.
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CRP payments & acreage in Indiana, by fiscal
year
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Figure 36: Indiana CRP Payments and Acreage 1997-2015
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
Figure 37 displays the 2014 CRP practices that received funding in order of most
to least funding. Filter strips are the most common use for CRP acres in Indiana by twofold. The practices following filter strips include the establishment of permanent
introduced grasses and legumes as well as vegetative cover and grass in general.
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CRP Acreage by Practice in Indiana, 2014
Filter strips

53,001

Establishment of permanent introduced grasses…

24,986

Vegetative cover, such as grass, that was already…

21,145

State Acres for Wildlife Enhancement - Grass--*

20,652

Establishment of permanent native grasses

19,967

Grass waterways, non-easement

19,084

Hardwood tree planting

18,521

Habitat for upland birds

13,954

Permanent wildlife habitat, non-easement
Vegetative cover, such as trees, that were…

8,508
5,693

Riparian buffer

5,671

Bottomland timber established on wetland

5,548

Wetland Restoration

4,631

Wetland restoration, non-flood plain

3,480

State Acres for Wildlife Enhancement - Trees

3,072

Rare and Declining Habitat

2,333

Field windbreak establishment, non-easement

2,011

Pollinator Habitat

1,318

Tree planting

1,021

Shallow water areas for wildlife

1,016

Figure 37: Most Acres in Indiana’s CRP by Practice in 2014
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
EQIP programs are the second most utilized program, representing seven
percent of all conservation programs, as shown in Figure 35. Figure 38 shows the
EQIP practices receiving the most funding in Indiana during the 1995 to 2014
period. Crop management is the largest use of EQIP dollars in Indiana, followed
incomparably by livestock confinement systems.
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EQIP practice suite payments in Indiana,
1997-2015
Crop Management

$59,446,492

Livestock Confinement Systems

$19,160,605

Water Control & Management

$14,450,872

Livestock Systems

$12,537,786

Grazing Management

$12,488,350

Pest Management
Forest Management

$9,468,164
$3,307,888

Conservation Buffers

$2,085,261

Technical Assistance & Assessment

$1,919,987

Miscellaneous

$1,243,674

Farm & Ranch Operation Facilities

$1,096,135

Air Quality

$850,684

Irrigation Systems

$829,886

Land Treatment or Reclamation

$632,222

Water Management

$515,624

Stream Corridor Management

$351,000

Energy

$181,197

Habitat Management

$149,579

Invasive & Noxious Species

$50,178

Figure 38: Indiana EQIP Payments by Practice Suit 1997-2015
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
In addition, Figure 39 shows the most common uses of EQIP contracts to be
nutrient management and integrated pest management used at similar rates. The third
most common practice EQIP dollars are used for is cover crops, and raises an interesting
point to note. Indiana National Resource Conservation Service State Conservationist,
Jane Hardisty, says Indiana is the 2nd largest user of cover crops in the nation (Hardisty,
2016). However, cover crops are not the highest use of EQIP funding. This may imply
that Indiana producers do not prioritize the incentive program to be used for cover crops
and would rather utilize it elsewhere and/or incorporate cover crops in their growing
programs already. It is important to highlight accomplishments of the EQIP contracts to
assess how funding is being allocated. Figure 40 shows over the period of 1997 to 2015,
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majority of EQIP funding went towards projects to reduce soil erosion, like cover crops,
nutrient management and no-till practices.

Most commonly used practices for EQIP
contracts in Indiana
Nutrient Management
Integrated Pest Management (IPM)
Cover Crop
Forage and Biomass Planting
Crop Residue Management
Forest Stand Improvement
Technical Assistance - Design
Heavy Use Area Protection
Fence
Watering Facility
Other Pipeline
Water and Sediment Control Basin
Technical Assistance - Practice Application
Technical Assistance - Check-Out Practice…
Underground Drainage Outlet
Agricultural Waste Recycling
Prescribed Grazing
Grassed Waterway
Subsurface Drain
Grade Stabilization Structure

2,540
2,305
1,832
1,479
1,363
1,160
1,148
1,075
1,043
947
937
767
651
645
609
563
515
481
363
346

Figure 39: Indiana Most Common Uses of EQIP Contracts by Practice
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
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EQIP impact on resource concerns in Indiana,
1997-2015
Soil Erosion

$41,587,084

Water Quality

$27,299,638

Fish and Wildlife

$19,488,206

Plant Condition

$15,021,380

Air Quality
Soil Quality
Livestock Production
Insufficient Water
Energy Efficiency

$11,504,968
$9,661,465
$9,146,091
$5,389,836
$3,969,202

Figure 40: EQIP Payments to Indiana Resource Concerns 1997-2015
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
With a growing interest and emphasis of CSP programs, as stated by Jane
Hardisty (Hardisty, 2016), noting what Indiana has done thus far will help identify
strengths and weaknesses of the program for Indiana farmers. Figure 41 shows that a
majority of the contracts have served similar needs as EQIP. Funded CSP contracts have
been awarded mostly to crop management and pest management practices. However,
CSP most common practices have more specific uses and include using drift reducing
nozzles, lower pressures, lower boom height and adjuvants to reduce pesticide drift as
well as plant tissue testing and analysis to improve nitrogen management. There was also
large uses of GPS targeted spray application (SmartSprayer) and other chemical
application electronic control technology.
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CSP practice suite contracts in Indiana,
Sign-ups 2010-2013
Crop Management

352

Pest Management

207

Farm & Ranch Operation Facilities

65

Conservation Buffers

47

Grazing Management

40

Habitat Management

31

Miscellaneous

18

Forest Management

13

Energy

9

Water Management

9

Water Control & Management

8

Crop and Pest Management

7

Irrigation Systems

6

Livestock Systems

2

Figure 41: Indiana Conservation Stewardship Program Contracts by Practice Suite 20102013
(USDA Freedom of Information Act)
With an important focus on constituency representation in farm bill debates,
knowing what a specific constituency might be most interested in gives context to the
topic at hand. A Senator on the Agriculture Committee is going to focus primarily on
representing his or her constituency, but information was needed to know what an
average constituency would look like. Indiana is a mid-level production state, with little
diversification. It is, what some would consider, an average case, yet it uses the farm
programs in a unique way only to the state. It will be important to remember throughout
the analysis that each state constituency is unique. The representation in the farm bill
debate process is assumedly important after researching a particular state and what is at
stake for the farmers that operate there.
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES

The following hypotheses are developed based on the accumulation of research
and analysis presented up to this point. The research question to be answered still
remains: what influences farm program payments?
1) The amount of total farm program payments received by a state is influenced by its
agricultural characteristics. This would include land in farms and number of farms as
driving forces behind how much each state receives in farm program payments.
2) The amount of total farm program payments received by a state is influenced by
having a representative on the United States Senate Agriculture Committee.
3) The position of Chairman of the Committee will be relevant, but will not be as
significant as having a seat on the Committee or a significant agricultural
constituency.
4) The total farm program payments will be significantly influenced by the CRP acres
and specific commodity cash receipts, predominantly corn and cotton.
5) Direct farm program payments will be significantly influenced by the amount of cash
receipts for a specific commodity in a state. Corn and cotton will be the two most
influential given the large presence the two commodities hold in U.S. agriculture and
the long history belonging to the traditional farm coalition (Coppess & Kuethe,
Mapping the Farm Bill: the Traditional Farm Coalition and Current Production,
2016).
6) Crop insurance subsidies will be predominantly influenced by agricultural given that
the program, alone, has become a staple of the farm bill for all commodities.
The following chapters of this thesis analyze farm program payments to the
United States individually beginning with a review of relevant literature. It was
important to look at the data holistically first before running the analysis to observe the
trends and dynamics surrounding farm program payments. That will be followed up with
a snapshot of a state example, Indiana, and how farm bill programs are utilized in the
state. For additional research, a survey was done to gather farmer opinions of farm
program payments, so a broader perspective could be captured on the grassroots level. A
summary of the empirical data and method used to execute the analysis is provided and
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discussed, followed by the research results. Conclusions and recommendations close the
analysis, as well as what additional research should follow this analysis.
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CHAPTER 4: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

When analyzing a topic related to the farm bill, there are a number of different
aspects to consider as outlined in the background of this thesis. There are the different
analyses that can occur to estimate the impact specific programs are having on other
aspects of the economy. Analyses can be done to estimate the impact and distribution
program payments have across the nation. There are analyses done to analyze the voting
record on farm bills and the role politics play in farm bill passages. Literature analysis
has even been done to anticipate the process of voting on a farm bill and how legislators
make their decisions. However, little to no research has been done to analyze the impact
constituent representation has on the amount of payments received after the passage of a
farm bill. The following chapter reviews literature that is available to lend itself to this
topic that explores the impact of public choice invested in a committee seat for farm
program payments.
U.S. Agriculture and Farm Policy Transformation
Before one can begin to research and learn about the largest piece of legislation in
United States agricultural policy, research needs to be done about where United States
agriculture policy was in the past and where it is going as the agricultural and farming
sector progresses forward. The USDA ERS report discusses the structural changes that
United States agriculture has experienced since the 1900s and the driving forces behind
the changes (Dimitri, Effland, & Conklin, 2005). As the article discusses, in the
beginning of the 20th century, agriculture was a leading occupation of the nation. It
consisted of small, diversified farms in rural communities that housed a larger portion of
the population. Farms were more labor intensive and work animals lead the way in
innovations. As technology has evolved and market conditions have changed, farming
has moved towards representing a smaller portion of the national economy and has seen
its role in rural communities diminish.
Beyond the changes in farms over the latest century, the report dives into the
long-run forces behind the changes. These include technological developments,
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consumer influence, and global markets. These key ideas frame the entirety of farm bills:
as the world of agriculture moves forward, what changes does the sector need in order to
survive and continue producing the products that impact not only the United States, but
the international world, as well? This is outlined in a brief of the report about the farm
policy changes that have occurred as context to sectorial changes in agriculture. Since
the very first farm bill, the core of agricultural policy in the United States, according to
not only this report but additional literature discussed later, is farm price and income
support programs in response to market shocks and general volatility. The report
highlights what was happening in the sector at the time specific farm bills were passed to
provide the framework that explains why farm bills persist and why the role of a farm bill
changes each and every time it is up for renewal.
The report discusses the sector’s ability to adapt and evolve as economic
environments change, but it also highlights the role agricultural policy has played to
provide support through those transitions. It does not argue the necessity for a farm bill
or other forms of agricultural policy, but rather the need to continue to respond to new
economic and political circumstances moving forward. The ultimate goal of agricultural
policy like the farm bill, according to the report is that these policies impact the pace of
the changes impacting the farming sector, rather than changing the entire situation. In
this sense, it helps understand the role policymakers have in crafting the legislation, but it
calls for more debate about the extent farm policy is meeting the objectives of the 21st
century farm sector in maintaining the well-being of farms and sustaining the agricultural
economy into the future.
Supporting Agricultural Protections
The Bellemare and Carnes Food Policy journal article (2014) investigates what
drives support for agricultural protections in the United States. The journal article
considers three influences on a legislator’s voting decision: legislator preferences,
electoral incentives, and lobbying and estimates using Ordinary least-squares (OLS)
regression to analyze three different outcomes. Those are the scores legislators receive
from the American Farm Bureau Federation and how legislators voted in the 2002 and
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2008 farm bills individually. This model creates the foundational experimental structure
used to analyze the hypotheses for this thesis.
Starting with a discussion of what is known as the “development paradox” as a
basis for discussion in supporting agricultural protections, the article dives deeper into the
driving forces behind legislator support of agriculture protections. Following the
introduction, the background of the paper gives a brief history of United States’
agricultural policy and the political economy of agricultural policy. In this section, one
of the most important points to note is cited from Paarlberg Food Politics book, “The
secret to every farm bill’s success in Congress is the lead role played by the House and
Senate Agriculture Committees, where members from farm states and farm districts enjoy
a dominant presence and are rewarded for their legislative efforts” (Paarlberg, 2011).
This is the particular piece of research that leads to the question of what kind of impact
does that “lead role” have on farm program payments.
This journal article specifically investigates motivations behind a specific vote,
with the binary dependent variable representing a “yea” or “no” vote. According to the
article, there are four explanations for agricultural protection: legislator preferences
where lawmakers vote according to their personal policy preferences; electoral incentives
where voters prefer agricultural protection and re-election-oriented policy makers follow
their lead; lobbying where interest groups representing agricultural producers lobby
policy makers and contribute to the re-election campaign; and institutions where a
country’s political institutions encourage agricultural protections. By regressing the vote
against the four motivations, the analysis can identify what the leading primary influence
is of a legislator’s vote on a farm bill.
This empirical framework, as well as experiment setup, provided the foundation
for the analysis in this thesis. In order to narrow down characteristic influences in the
article, the Bellemare/Carnes experiment tested three independent variables separately
and all together. By doing this, individual characteristics interact with the other variables
and the analysis of a “baseline” before politics can be performed.
A major conclusion from Bellemare/Carnes was the most important factor
discovered in the OLS estimation: “the single most important factor seems to be that so
many legislators represent constituents who stand to benefit from agricultural subsidies”
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(2014). This is most helpful in narrowing the independent variables of this research
study. If legislators are more inclined to represent constituency interests, then the
constituency interests are anticipated to drive the farm program payments for that state.
Additionally, the article discovers “the one explanation that almost always explains
support for agricultural protection is the electoral [or constituent] pressure a legislator
faces” (Bellemare & Carnes, 2014). In fact, a legislator’s preferences for agricultural
protection is a substitute with the degree of electoral pressure facing the legislator.
For future research, the article specifically calls for a study on the specific work
of the committees writing a farm bill. As with most legislation, policy development and
legislation writing occurs at the committee level. Bellemare/Carnes want future research
that would explore in greater detail the role of the House and Senate Agricultural
Committee membership. This is what this thesis hopes to accomplish.
The Value of Committee Seats in the U.S. Senate
There is little to no previous literature to provide quantitative insight into the
question of whether some congressional committees are more valuable than others. In
the Stewart III and Groseclose article (1999), the research aims to apply a new method of
measuring value of a committee membership in the House and applying it to the Senate.
The article references the well-researched classification of committees in Congress, in
which committees fall into three categories, the highest ranked committee listed first:
prestige-oriented committees, policy-oriented committees, and constituency-oriented
committees. The “Johnson rule” of the Senate lists the top four committees, similarly, as
ranked by researched estimates. These are Appropriations, Armed Services, Finance, and
Foreign Relations Senate Committees. Senators, on average, participate on two
committees, but exceptions are made in order to conjure participation on committees
considered “housekeeping” and undesired.
This article lists one of its most important uses as being a dependent or
independent variable to explain other political phenomenon, as similarly used in this
analysis. Overall, the Senate Agriculture Committee ranks eleventh in value for the 81st
through 102nd Congress. It is considered to be a constituency-oriented committee and has
a positive coefficient that considers the committee to not be a burden on a Senator
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Committee member. Knowing a Senator’s primary motivation for membership on the
Senate Agriculture Committee is constituency-based, the act of estimating this research
model by state follows literature closely. Additionally, Stewart and Groseclose conclude
that Senators have less agreement than the House over which committees are most
valued, and thus would have very different motivations when pursuing appointment to a
certain committee.
Committee Assignments in the U.S. Senate
Endersby and McCurdy (1996) state a foundational point to this research by
laying the groundwork for research of committee assignments in the Senate and
explaining assignments to important committees increases members’ power to control the
legislative agenda. When researching the impact a Senator’s influence on farm program
payments, his or her role on the Agriculture Committee is important because, as stated in
this article, committee assignments are important in determining the political and
electoral success of the incumbent.
This literature, like Stewart III and Groseclose (1999), estimates the relative value
of committee seats in the Senate, however this one uses a different method of estimation.
Past research committee studies have primarily focused on the observations in the House
chamber. The Senate, according to this article, makes for an interesting subject because
of its less-hierarchy structure. Seniority is not as frequently enforced as it is in the House
and the Senate has a reputation of being more flexible in its proceedings.
Endersby and McCurdy go on to describe why committees matter so much in
their role to exert control over specific policy areas. Committees provide the opportunity
for a specific Senator to specialize in an area that they have prior expertise, which usually
includes a constituency expertise. Ultimately, it is important to note from this literature
that assignments are based on a “senator’s reelection prospects, previous political and
occupational experience, concerns with policy issues, and power and prestige” (Endersby
& McCurdy, 1996).
From this particular literature piece, this thesis can develop around the assumption
made that Senators do not necessarily get to choose to be a member of the Agriculture
Committee, but rather are vetted extensively by leadership. A Senator can and does
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lobby extensively for specific committee membership, as outlined in the literature, in
hopes of accomplishing personal or constituency-based policy goals. As the literature
states in the conclusion, legislators evaluate the importance of committee assignments
based on the various motivations and act based on those evaluations. Thus, for this
thesis, it can be assumed that each of those Senators serving on the Agriculture
Committee serve with a distinct purpose and agenda regarding federal farm policy.
Empirical Analysis of Congressional Voting on Farm Bill Legislation
Lee and Tkachyk (1987) describe a wide “gulf between ‘agricultural policy,’ as
practiced by economists, and the ‘politics of agriculture,’ as represented ultimately by
Congressional action,” especially when it came to voting for a farm bill that included the
nutrition title. Similarly, this thesis is motivated by the difference in the politics of
agricultural policy and the actual legislation that passes. Understanding the viewpoints of
not only the political parties, but also the individual commodities and states that are
represented is essential to understanding how a farm bill is able to pass and for this
research, learning about the influence behind the farm program payments can provide
insight into that topic. From the literature, understanding the motivation behind the vote
and what drives a vote on farm bill legislation provides additional viewpoints within the
context of the legislative process.
What is most important from this literature is the similar application of economic
theory used to perform the empirical analysis that is also used in this thesis. The authors
deem this “the ‘economic’ theory of politics” that is based on the idea that a political
character will act in the same manner an economic character would as a utility
maximizer. Thus, their actions would be predictable based on reactions to marginal costs
and benefits. For this thesis, the theory is applied to the way a Senator would represent a
state on the Senate Agriculture Committee if appointed to serve. The constituencyoriented value placed on a seat for the Senate Agriculture Committee is marginally
beneficial to specific states in their amount of farm program payments received, and
therefore a Senator will look to optimize his or her clout and influence to increase the
margin for the return of getting reelected. This would be in line with the cited
information regarding the theory of collective decision-making in political science.
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Additionally, the staff paper mentions the plethora of empirical studies that make
efforts to quantitatively estimate legislative voting models and the ability to explain
votes, but there are inconsistent results across the board. Each time a study estimates the
relative importance of the specific determinants of voting behaviors, the conclusions vary
sharply. One of the larger issues of the papers is the attempt to estimate impact with the
inclusion of party and ideology variables in voting behavior. Therefore, since the issue is
so divisive, this thesis follows the recommendation of the staff paper and ignores party
and ideological preferences to focus specifically on the process variable within the Senate
Agriculture Committee seat.
The results of Lee and Tkachyk’s paper are of particular interest to this thesis
analysis. The authors concluded that, in particular, economic characteristics of
constituents were significant in determining voting patterns for farm bill legislation. A
vote for a farm bill was determined to be more likely if the state had greater dependence
on farm program payments, as well. This report did determine ideology to play a
significant role, however, after following up with similar literature, it would seem that
ideology is influencing in certain periods of time in United States economic and political
environments. The conclusion here is that purely ideological foundations are not likely to
determine legislative support for farm programs.
Cognitive Model of the Senate Agriculture Committee
Literature from Boynton became particularly interesting because of the
investigation into “how they did it” in crafting agricultural policy legislation. The article
applies congressional law-making to cognitive science for insight into the processedthinking that takes place in Senate Agriculture Committee discussions regarding the farm
bill.
Though the article lacks economic modelling, its attributes to this thesis by
applying a conceptual framework for thinking about how a farm bill is created and
adjusted every five years. It begins by discussing the process of starting a farm bill with
the Secretary of Agriculture, farm organizations, and the legislators compiling testimony
of how the law has worked, what problems have surfaced since the last one passed and
how can it be improved to help farmers. The article points out the root of the farm bill in
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its simplest form: all members of the Senate Agriculture Committee and all the witnesses
brought in “want to improve the lot of farmers” without disagreement to the outcome, but
the conversations circle around what the law should be in order to achieve this shared
outcome.
The article sheds light on the uniqueness of the committee and how important a
Senator-member’s experience is to the Committee. The author comments that
agricultural policy has its own language that is “arcane”, and otherwise understood by
only a few. Even if the membership of the Committee were to change and someone new
would learn the language and build on that experience to be effective. Boynton calls it
the “lore” of the committee that is learned, recalled, and reinforced in the conversations
of the committee. This speaks to the uniqueness of the research and how this topic is so
rarely explored. Only few can understand it and even fewer take interest in exploring it,
but many have vested interest in the result.
Most appropriate to note from this article is what are referred to as the five global
points that every member of the committee is firmly committed to producing in a farm
bill:
1) “The law should contain provisions to protect farm income when there is
precipitous drop in demand, even during periods when demand and prices are
high.
2) Bringing supply into line with demand is accomplished by controlling supply
rather than improving demand.
3) Voluntary rather than mandatory programs are needed.
4) U.S. agriculture should participate in the international market rather than
producing only for the U.S. market.
5) The programs should be designed to minimize the cost to the government as there
is a limit on what Congress will spend on agriculture.” (Boynton, 1990)
In addition, the understanding of the farm bill process was best explained through
combating the boom and bust cycles of agriculture. Noting that understanding the actions
of the farm bill requires locating specific commodities and the stage of the boom and bust
cycle it may be in during the action. Agricultural policy tended to accomplish the
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ultimate goal of protecting farm income and improving farmer conditions through
legislation that would help survive the bust.
Boynton describes the task of the Agriculture Committee being able to understand
a multidimensional world. A world that includes all of the major United States
commodities (those covered by the farm bill and those that are not) organized across
different stages of a boom and bust cycle using only the strategies set forth in the
governing structure that impacts globally. Constantly, Agriculture Committee members
are asking themselves “What would farmers do if…?” (Boynton, 1990). Overall,
learning about “how” the Agriculture Committee thinks during the process of crafting
farm bill legislation attributes to understanding the process of writing a farm bill because
it identifies the motivations behind the Agriculture Committee’s actions. It provides
validity to the unique political and economic environment that the farm bill operates,
commodities rather than partisan and boom or bust. Additionally, this article gives a
noneconomic perspective to researching the question holistically and gaining insight into
the reasons behind the actions.
Representation in Congress: The Case of the House Agriculture Committee
Though the Jones’ 1961 article is dated, it continues to lend itself to
understanding the role of the Senate Agriculture Committee counterpart in the House,
and sets up a compare and contrast between the two chamber committees. Jones leads
with the discussion of a representative democracy by using the House Agriculture
Committee as an example for answering from which viewpoint a representative makes a
decision. Using interviews, surveys, committee hearing transcripts, and voting records,
Jones compiles what is called the “policy constituency” in which the representative’s
interests in a policy align within the geographical constituency and its impact from said
policy.
The explanation of the committee organization helps identify the complexity of
the House committees. With more membership, much of the work for the committee is
done in the subcommittees, in which the Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee
usually assigns a member to at least one commodity subcommittee of his choice that is a
permanent, continuous appointment. Agriculture Committee organization, according to
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Jones, is primarily influenced by the problems in agriculture that each commodity
individually is facing. Size of the subcommittees vary and allow for House members to
participate in those subcommittees of interest to them. Subcommittees have since
changed names and focus, but the process remains the same (United States. Congress.
Senate.).
The representation of agriculture on the committee was much more prominent at
the time in which this article was written. It was an expectation that Congressman from
constituencies with significant interest in farm policy would make up the majority of the
House Agriculture Committee. As it is today, the committee was still bipartisan, but
tended to follow commodity lines. This note is particularly important because of the
explanation that farm bill politics is less about party affiliation, but rather agricultural
constituency. Jones highlights the 1958 House Agriculture Committee in which 13 of the
19 Democrats represented tobacco, cotton, peanuts, and rice areas of constituencies.
Republicans of the committee represented areas heavily producing corn, hogs, small
grain, wheat, and diversified farming operations.
Additionally, this article emphasizes the traditional farm coalition members that
contributed to the formulation of the independent variables. According to Jones, the
“basic commodities” as it was labeled in the 1938 farm bill are corn, cotton, tobacco,
rice, wheat, and peanuts. Knowing these are the primary drivers behind the commodity
programs provides context to a Senator’s constituency interest on the Senate Agriculture
Committee. If by serving on the committee in the faith it is in the best interest of the
constituency provides more farm program payments for farmers, then the value of that
seat, as also provided in literature, will increase.
The article provides a detailed synopsis of the 1958 farm bill debate, which adds
to the anecdote of how complicated and entangled the farm bill process can get. The
drama of each and every farm bill has been highlighted in similar accounts in literature
that detail the negotiations and strategies employed to pass a farm bill. For Jones,
gaining insight from the legislators in the midst of the drama provided the research
necessary to make conclusions about their views on the legislation itself. Additionally,
there was research done to gain insight into members’ opinions of the specific titles in the
farm bill legislation. Those seem to differ based on the deal each commodity received in
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the legislation and the constituency interest of the legislator related to the commodity.
Given that Jones emphasizes how important constituencies’ interests in the specific titles
are important to legislators, it is helpful in this particular research to apply the same
motivation when seated on the Senate Agriculture Committee. Each representative is
going to “represent” the commodities of its constituencies and base their opinions of the
legislation on the deal each commodity receives.
Overall, the concept of representation on the House Agriculture Committee as
Jones explains is primarily influenced by the constituency interest at stake in the process.
It was also indicated that legislators preferred an open forum “sounding-board” model to
gain insight into where the constituency stood on the issues in the legislation. Thus,
legislators felt they knew the specific wishes of the constituency in order to legislate in
the best interest of the people they represent. This provides a lot of information on why
the motivation to be on the Agriculture Committee would be so important to a legislator.
This leads to a primary conclusion from Jones that if a policy provision is anticipated to
have a direct effect on the interests of a constituency, then that legislator will rely on
what is best for that constituency when working on the farm bill legislation.
Farm Bill Foundational Research
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) provides non-biased research reports
for the Members and Committees of Congress in an effort to provide as much
information as possible on a topic legislators are making decisions on. Renee Johnson, a
Specialist in Agricultural Policy, is the lead contributor for research related to the 2014
farm bill, as well as the upcoming 2018 farm bill. “What Is the Farm Bill?” is the leading
resource in this analysis providing background information about the farm bill. For
newcomers, especially to the Agriculture Committee, a report of this nature provides the
most elementary description of the farm bill and its process. A historical timeline, budget
implications, and title-by-title summaries helped piece together the important background
research necessary for an understanding of the topic.
For this thesis, it was especially important to include background information as
the foundation for the research, as well as a view looking forward. As the discussions for
the 2018 farm bill approach, the report “Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill”, also by Renee
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Johnson and associate teams, provides background of each specific title. There is a brief
history, as well as what current programs reside in the title. The report includes an
individual issue forecast for each title and the potential issues that may factor into the
overall debate of the legislation. The background information provided in this thesis is
brief compared to the Two CRS reports, but should be enough foundational knowledge to
grasp the parameters this thesis aims to work within.
In addition to the non-partisan reporting of CRS, farmdoc daily compiled
academic papers in an article from the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association
2017 Annual Meeting in Chicago authored by thirteen agricultural economists. Each
paper described a specific issue in the farm bill that is expected to surface during the
2018 farm bill debate. The issues are insurance programs, crop commodity programs
(except cotton), cotton crop commodity only, dairy, livestock and specialty crops,
nutrition, environmental services, rural development, research and extension, trade and
energy (Zulauf, Schnitkey, & Orden, 2017). Explained simply, each paper provided a
policy setting, the issue surrounding the farm bill topic, and what to watch as discussions
move forward in the debate. This, again, provided general context of the farm bill and
why it matters in the grand scheme of United States agricultural policy.
The Agricultural and Applied Economics Association has taken keen interest in
publishing topics related to the farm bill. While the articles featured in Choices
publication have not investigated topics related to this research, there is a significant
amount of background information within these articles. One in particular is most
important to note. Mercier’s 2016 article “The Making of a Farm Bill” lays out a brief
history of farm bills and provides a foundational knowledge of the key players of the
farm bill debate. It explains the stakeholders, including lobbying interests, and their role
throughout the process of crafting, debating and executing the legislation. The roles of
agricultural economists and the public’s involvement are discussed in this article, which
seem to be missing in other articles. With the extent to which this article discusses the
process surrounding the farm bill legislation, it adds to this thesis in its ability to
summarize the process simply and effectively. The article gave enough of a foundation
and background information that one could generate a plethora of research questions and
analysis opportunities about the farm bill.
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Political Economy of Farm Bills
In addition to the primary literature sources used to mold the econometric
research and the general farm bill research, many resources were used to convey the
political dynamics behind the farm bill, whether it was for one individual farm bill or
overall in the analysis of agricultural protections in a government structure. Most
important to note is Orden and Zulauf (2015) which discusses the political economy that
shaped the most recent farm bill in 2014. The article provided an extensive explanation
of how the programs, newly enacted, were to operate, as well as the universal arguments
of the past two decades. Farm bill debates over the years have provided continuity and
change in a variety of aspects. Orden and Zulauf aim to outlay what that has looked like
and how the environment has changed over time. Important to this paper is the
understanding that farm policy has evolved to become more reliant on the parameters of a
policy rather than set statute policies. This way, as other literature has alluded to as well,
the policies adjust with the market rather than rely on the government to “fix” the issues.
It also brings up the important discussions that most impact a farm bill, including
coalitions, the farm economy, and the budget constraints.
Similarly, Thies and Porche (2007) do an assessment of the political economy on
a global perspective and emphasize the importance of including a political variable in
economic models regarding producer support. This emphasizes the importance of the
research being done to assess the impact of the political factors in farm programs. It also
brings up the discussion that agricultural production has had to evolve around the
changes in technology, product specialization, and increased economies of scale. Just as
farm bills have reacted to the boom and bust cycles, Thies and Porche bring up the
element of these transformations in the industry that have forced policy conversations
about how to support producers in the transitions. It does compare and contrast
developing and developed countries and their approaches to agricultural support. Though
the “development paradox”, as it is often termed, is a foundational idea to agricultural
protections, this analysis goes a step further to analyze the effects of the policies in place
as a result of the paradox (Bellemare & Carnes, 2014). Finally, the disagreement
between political scientists and economists regarding agricultural protections is
interesting in the aspects regarding predicting agricultural support. Purely economic
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models that have been performed argue that adding political factors does not add
substantial information. However, in Thies and Porche analysis, they prove it is
justifiable to include political variables, rather than just assume them to be outside
factors, as economists would do. This provides motivation to include two different
political variables in this thesis.
Brooks (1997) adds to the discussion when determining the votes on
congressional amendments to limit payments to farmers in farm bill discussions. It, too,
addresses the concern of the influence of campaign contributions, but focuses primarily
on the influence an ideological identification has on a legislator’s vote. In this article,
ideology is in reference to the ideology of their constituency with the justification that the
constituents are likely to elect politicians with similar views or because politicians
respond to their constituents to ensure reelection. The results of Brooks’ experiments
were fairly inconclusive, discovering that there needs to be a better way to measure
lobbying activity and campaign contributions have inconsistent impacts on voting
decisions. Most importantly, it was evident in the article that the author estimated the
impact too late in the bill making process to gauge an impact. As a number of sources
have indicated, the most important legislation crafting and debate happens at the
committee level. It would seem Brooks had inconsistent and somewhat inconclusive
results due to the fact that there is little consideration of the role of the committee and all
of its work. Brooks challenges many of the conclusions determined from other sources
and forces critical thinking about how a study regarding farm bill legislation should be
performed.
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

What influences farm program payments? Gathering as much information about
the farm bill, including academic research, political analyses, a state example, and farmer
perspectives, helps craft an overall understanding of the farm bill before developing a
model in which to try to answer the research question. To date, it has yet to be
academically researched, but speculation of the political process and other factors
influencing political decision-making have been thoroughly analyzed, even regarding the
farm bill. It is not, however, known if growing a specific commodity adds more farm
program payments to a state or if it is more significant to have a state’s U.S. Senator sit
on the Senate Agriculture Committee to negotiate on behalf of the constituents receiving
the payments. The following methodology was used to investigate this further.
Theoretical framework
Many factors could be considered in the estimation of farm program payments,
but for this thesis, it was important to follow the recommendations of literature and data
research in determining the variables. This portion is used to explain why the specific
variables were chosen to answer the research question at hand.
Using the Senate Rather than the House
The primary reason to use the Senate chamber rather than the House chamber for
this thesis was because of the way representation is determined. The Senate chamber is
designed to provide each state equal representation, while the House representation is
determined by population. For this thesis, because it is based on a state’s reception of
farm program payments, it was most logical to use the representation variable most
consistent with that strategy. More specifically, by using the Senate chamber, each state
was considered in equitable conditions of representation, even if the state was not a
strong agricultural state.
Additionally, the Senate chamber has a longer term than the House, six years
versus two years until reelection. This assumes the Senate has more time to dedicate to
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specific legislation, as well as gain the experience necessary to serve on the Agriculture
Committee (Boynton, 1990). There has been more research done to evaluate the value a
Senator holds on a committee seat, especially when considering the Agriculture
Committee. Therefore, there is more validity that a state’s agricultural interests are
represented on the Agriculture Committee due to the consideration that the committee is
a constituency-based committee (Stewart III & Groseclose, 1999).
Role of Committees
Committees are where the primary work of legislation occurs. There is an
extremely high success rate for legislation that passes committee and goes for a floor vote
(Boynton, 1990). Furthermore, research identifies the most active members of relevant
committees to be the central players to shaping and directing policy initiatives that, in
turn, are passed on the Congressional floor. The Agriculture Committee specifically is a
homogeneous committee, fairly autonomous from the other branches of government and
the impacts they may have on agriculture. It is unique in itself, and as Boynton
comments, it is “lore” among agricultural policy players. It requires continuity in
membership and understanding because of the shared language and shared experiences
required to be recalled in writing a farm bill. Being on this committee requires a type of
“experience” in order to understand what is needed to be done (Boynton, 1990).
Committee membership is important to legislators. Committee assignments are
based on a legislator’s resume, including reelection prospects, occupational experience,
previous political experience, personal concerns with a specific policy issue, as well as
power and prestige (Endersby & McCurdy, 1996). A legislator may lobby for a specific
committee seat, but it is not his or her decision to choose which committee to serve.
Also, literature alluded to the fact that research models estimated for Congress as a
whole, no matter the chamber, tended to be inconclusive and inconsistent. The
committee level would seem to be where the best results were to be concluded.
Committee Membership Is to Be Considered Exogenous
Typical econometric models hold the effects of politics as being endogenous and,
as literature has indicated, a Senator’s primary motivation for membership on the Senate
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Agriculture Committee is constituency-based. Thus, one could infer that membership on
the Senate Agriculture Committee is endogenous in the following econometric research.
However, committee seats are assigned by leadership and driven by seniority (Endersby
& McCurdy, 1996). Therefore, a Senator’s membership is not in his or her own control.
Additionally, the money received by a state in farm program payments does not affect
whether or not a Senator is chosen to serve on the Committee or not, but this analysis
strives to determine if that Committee membership affects the amount of payments for
the state.
Avoiding Multicollinearity
When the initial regression was considered, land in farms and number of farms
were to be included together in each set of equations. However, a test for
multicollinearity was necessary before moving forward. When the test was performed,
multicollinearity was observed and land in farms was determined highly insignificant. A
correlation table was then performed to determine if the two variables correlated in some
way that would distort the results. Since both variables represent similar production
characteristics but were determined not to be highly correlated (see Table 5), it was
decided to test both variables, but separate them to diversify the results of the analysis.
Some states may be bigger in land area in farms but have fewer farms than other states
and vice versa. This allows the analysis to test the impact of the questions at hand in both
kinds of situations.
Commodity Representation
It was important to include all the traditional commodities that were considered
part of the traditional and expanded farm coalitions as defined by Coppess (2016).
Farmdoc daily discusses that the contribution of each commodity to the overall economy
of an area could vary and therefor gives merit to including each commodity individually
(Coppess & Kuethe, 2016). Soybeans were represented by the corn variable due to the
overlapping representation both experience. Jones confirms that the “basic commodities”
as it was labeled in the 1938 farm bill are corn, cotton, tobacco, rice, wheat, and peanuts
(1961). Peanuts and tobacco were individually omitted due to the policy reformation
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experienced by the two commodities, but are included in overall direct payment totals
(Dohlman, Foreman, & Da Pra, 2009). Thus, the commodities are represented by the
cash receipts received by each state for the production of animals and products, rice,
wheat, corn, and cotton.
Explanation of Data
Dependent Variables
One of the dependent variables included is the United States Federal Government
direct farm program payments, 1989-2015 Nominal (current dollars). The data collected
from the USDA ERS Farm Income and Wealth Statistics compiles data beginning in
1933 regarding direct farm program payments. All commodity program payments are
totaled in an individual data set due to the transition between programs over the history of
farm bills. Data was collected for individual commodities (feed grains, wheat, rice,
cotton, wool) when they were individual programs and first able to collect the data in
1969. When the farm bill consolidated all the commodities into one title, the data shifted
to be reflected in the “production flexibility contract payments” for data record keeping.
Fixed direct payments and counter-cyclical payments are data tracked beginning in their
creation in 2002. Peanuts and milk were just beginning to be tracked as individual
programs in 2002. The Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) Program, created in the
2008 farm bill, was next in data sets to be collected following the policy shift. When
ACRE was replaced by Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage
(PLC) in the 2014 farm bill, data was collected for the two programs separately.
Following commodity programs, direct farm program payments also include
Conservation programs, the Biomass Crop Assistance Program, Supplemental and ad hoc
disaster assistance and miscellaneous program payments a state may have received
funding from. Because of the policy changes and program transformations, we cannot
test funding data of a specific program. Thus, all data is tested in the aggregated form of
United States Federal Government direct farm program payments.
Additionally dependent variables are the crop insurance subsidy and indemnity
payments received by a state according to the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation

91
(FCIC) which has tracked the data since 1989. The subsidy is the amount the
government pays in each state to subsidize the crop insurance premium. The indemnity
is the payment received following a crop insurance claim for each state. FCIC also tracks
number of policies sold, how many policies earned a premium and/or indemnity, similar
data by unit, and tracks the amount of liability insured and the total premium paid by both
the producer and the government. For this thesis, only data collected regarding funds
paid by the government are considered.
Independent Variables
The independent variables selected were to encompass the factors that are
included in considering farm program payments and are divided between government
program participation, agriculture production, and farm characteristics, as well as
constituent representation. To represent government program participation, the number
of acres under a Conservation Reserve Program contract that is paying a rental rate to a
producer to put highly erodible land out of production is included. This data is direct
from the USDA FSA department in the CRP enrollment and rental rate database. CRP
acres under contract are included for each state because CRP decisions are considered a
substitute to production of commodities and the interaction with the other commodities
will need to be explored. All commodities cash receipts is the aggregated figure included
to encompass agricultural production for the state from the USDA ERS Farm Income and
Wealth Statistics. This number will also be broken down into the five commodities
represented in order to analyze the driving commodity behind farm program payments.
Farm characteristics from USDA NASS include the number of farms and the amount of
land a state has in farms to encompass the quantity of the farm constituency in a state and
the area in which is dedicated to agriculture.
Finally, constituent representation is in the form of number of Senators on the
Agriculture Committee during each year, compiled from a book commissioned by former
Senator Richard Lugar to provide a history of the United States Senate Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. The book compiles the committee from 1825
through 1998 and the remaining years were compiled through public record of the Senate.
For each state in the given year, all the Senators representing the state with a seat on the
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Agriculture Committee were counted. For example, in 1991, Iowa had two seats on the
Senate Agriculture Committee occupied by Iowan Senators, and was, therefore, recorded
as such in the count. The final independent variable is a binary variable included to
classify if the state was represented in the Chairmanship of the Senate Agriculture
Committee. Appendix 3 is a list of the Senators in alphabetical order by state who served
on the Agriculture Committee for the duration of the study period.
Variables Defined
The data is panel data for all 50 states from 1989 through 2015. The subscript i
represents the state the data correlated, while j is the year.
The variables are defined as:
1
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠)
2
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 (𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠)
3
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠)
1
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 (𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠)
2
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑠 (𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠)
3
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 (𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠)
4
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠 (𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠)
5
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝐴𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑠 (𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠)
6
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝑅𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑠 (𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠)
7
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑠 (𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠)
8
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑠 (𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠)
9
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑠 (𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠)
10
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛)
11
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
= 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛)
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Estimation Strategy
Testing the Correlation of the Variables
Before the estimation strategy can be employed, an investigation into the specific
relationships among the variables is needed to be done. A descriptive statistic table is
displayed in Table 4 along with the creation of a correlation table in Table 5. A
correlation table was created to determine if any specific variable correlates uniquely
with another specific variable. If excessive correlation did exist among specific
variables, one would need to be omitted from the estimation. There was no significant
correlation among specific variables that forced one to be omitted, so the estimation
could proceed as explained below.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Data
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Median

Minimum

Maximum

Count

254,775,160.74
54,642,035.69

8,917,615.95
2,935,800.88

139,923,000.00
11,961,996.00

327,654,131.88
107,868,212.28

90,000.00
-

2,303,189,000.00
732,218,108.00

1350
1350

84,760,107.62

6,063,108.63

20,914,298.00

222,772,835.92

-

3,513,226,462.00

1350

394,177,304.05

14,586,559.09

199,414,393.00

535,944,403.20

119,704.00

4,583,807,560.00

1350

646,591.59

24,594.46

253,749.85

903,658.04

-

4,074,070.20

1350

4,975,548,622.22

163,264,479.14

3,449,445,500.00

5,998,720,005.09

25,735,000.00

56,610,406,000.00

1350

2,386,783,574.81

70,521,242.94

1,593,867,500.00

2,591,115,918.48

5,227,000.00

16,950,166,000.00

1350

37,509,982.96

4,125,561.82

-

151,582,820.41

-

1,394,888,000.00

1350

179,237,799.26

8,712,345.95

46,269,500.00

320,112,030.75

-

2,567,008,000.00

1350

573,246,716.30

37,624,183.00

66,793,500.00

1,382,400,755.09

-

13,364,355,000.00

1350

114,477,342.22

8,025,764.61

-

294,885,421.53

-

2,926,707,000.00

1350

42,824.69
18,888,327.41

1,061.54
595,041.36

36,800.00
11,600,000.00

39,003.53
21,863,215.48

520.00
60,000.00

248,500.00
132,000,000.00

1350
1350

0.39

0.02

-

0.56

-

2.00

1350

0.02

0.00

-

0.15

-

1.00

1350
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Variable
Federal Government
Direct Farm Program
Payments (Dollars)
FCIC Subsidy (Dollars)
FCIC Indemnity
(Dollars)
Sum of All Government
Farm
Payments
CRP Acres Under
Contract (Acres)
All Commodities cash
receipts (Dollars)
Animals and products
cash receipts (Dollars)
Rice cash receipts
(Dollars)
Wheat cash receipts
(Dollars)
Corn cash receipts
(Dollars)
Cotton cash receipts
(Dollars)
Number of Farms
(Farms)
Land in Farms (Acres)
Number of Senators on
the Agriculture
Committee (Person)
Binary Chairman of the
Senate Ag Committee
(Person)

Standard
Error

Table 5: Correlation of Equation Variables
Federal
Governme
nt direct
farm
program
payments

FCIC
Indemnity
($)

All
commodi
ties cash
receipts

Anima
ls and
produc
ts cash
receipt
s

Rice
cash
receipt
s

Wheat
cash
receipt
s

Corn
cash
receipt
s

Cotton
cash
receipt
s

Numbe
r of
Farms

Land
in
Farms
(acres)

Numbe
r of
Senator
s on Ag
Commit
tee

Chair
man?

1.00
0.44

1.00

0.35

0.75

1.00

0.62

0.45

0.38

1.00

0.52

0.64

0.50

0.34

1.00

0.61

0.63

0.52

0.47

0.87

1.00

0.15

0.09

0.05

(0.03)

0.39

0.29

1.00

0.31

0.52

0.36

0.68

0.26

0.27

(0.02)

1.00

0.43

0.67

0.55

0.25

0.55

0.49

(0.05)

0.14

1.00

0.37

0.25

0.24

0.29

0.45

0.52

0.40

0.01

(0.06)

1.00

0.67

0.44

0.39

0.55

0.59

0.71

0.16

0.20

0.32

0.61

1.00
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Federal
Government
direct farm
program
payments
FCIC
Subsidy ($)
FCIC
Indemnity
($)
CRP Acres
Under
Contract
All
commodities
cash receipts
Animals
and products
cash receipts
Rice cash
receipts
Wheat cash
receipts
Corn cash
receipts
Cotton cash
receipts
Number of
Farms

FCIC
Subsi
dy ($)

CRP
Acres
Unde
r
Contr
act

Land in
Farms
(acres)
Number of
Senators on
Ag
Committee
Chairman?

0.62

0.45

0.40

0.83

0.44

0.59

0.07

0.46

0.22

0.54

0.68

1.00

0.44
0.10

0.35
0.05

0.22
0.02

0.40
(0.01)

0.24
0.05

0.29
0.05

0.12
0.10

0.31
(0.03)

0.37
0.10

(0.01)
0.02

0.22
0.03

0.26
(0.03)

1.00
0. 20

1.00
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Empirical Application Strategy
In the empirical application strategy, farm program payments are modeled as a
function of government program participation, agriculture production, and farm
characteristics, as well as constituent representation. All regression equations are to be
tested four times: (a) the first with a baseline, (b) the second with the Number of Senators
on the Agriculture Committee variable only, (c) the third with the Chairman binary
variable only, and (d) the fourth with both constituency representation independent
variables included. The OLS panel data method was used throughout this thesis analysis.
It is first important to test the model holistically to identify the significant
influences initially on farm program payments. The first set of equations tests the
influence of CRP acres under contract, all cash receipts for all products in a state and land
of the state in farms regressed on all farm program payments, which includes direct
payments and crop insurance subsidies and crop insurance indemnities. This would give
a general perspective of what influences farm program payments, especially considering
the farming diversity of each state.
(1a)

1
2
3
1
2
3
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(1b)

1
2
3
1
2
3
10
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(1c)

1
2
3
1
2
3
11
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(1d)

1
2
3
1
2
3
10
11
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

The second set of equations tests the influence of CRP acres under contract, all
cash receipts for all products in a state and number of farms in the state regressed on all
farm program payments, which includes direct payments and crop insurance subsidies
and indemnities.
(2a)

1
2
3
1
2
4
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(2b)

1
2
3
1
2
4
10
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(2c)

1
2
3
1
2
4
11
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(2d)

1
2
3
1
2
4
10
11
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
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The next two sets of equations test the influence of CRP acres under contract and
the individual commodity cash receipts of that state regressed on all farm program
payments. The commodity receipts included are animals and products cash receipts
(which would include milk production), rice cash receipts, wheat cash receipts, corn cash
receipts and cotton cash receipts. Again, land in farms and number of farms were
separated to estimate the impact independently.
This first set includes Land in Farms:
(3a)

1
2
3
1
3
5
6
7
8
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+

9
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(3b)

1
2
3
1
3
5
6
7
8
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+

9
10
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(3c)

1
2
3
1
3
5
6
7
8
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+

9
11
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(3d)

1
2
3
1
3
5
6
7
8
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+

9
10
11
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

This set of equations mirrors the previous, but replaces Land in Farms with
Number of Farms.
(4a)

1
2
3
1
4
5
6
7
8
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+

9
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(4b)

1
2
3
1
4
5
6
7
8
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+

9
10
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(4c)

1
2
3
1
4
5
6
7
8
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+

9
11
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(4d)

1
2
3
1
4
5
6
7
8
(𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
) = 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+

9
10
11
𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

The next two sets of equations shift direction and look to test the impact on only
the federal direct farm program payments as the dependent variable. The independent
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variables are CRP acres under contract and the individual commodity receipts, including
animals and products cash receipts (which would include milk production), rice cash
receipts, wheat cash receipts, corn cash receipts, cotton cash receipts, and land in farms
and number of farms. Again, land in farms and number of farms are tested individually
due to their mulitcollinearity.
(5a)

1
1
3
5
6
7
8
9
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(5b)

1
1
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(5c)

1
1
3
5
6
7
8
9
11
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(5d)

1
1
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

Exchanging Land in Farms for Number of Farms are shown in the following
equations and results are in Table 11.
(6a)

1
1
4
5
6
7
8
9
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(6b)

1
1
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(6c)

1
1
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(6d)

1
1
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

The final test involves the FCIC crop insurance subsidy as the dependent variable
and tests the impact of the commodity receipts regressed on crop insurances subsidies, in
addition to the Senate representation. The subsidy is regressed against the land in farms,
rice, wheat, corn and cotton cash receipts and the Senate Agriculture Committee variables
and shown in Table 12. The set is again tested separately against number of farms
replacing land in farms.
(7a)

2
3
6
7
8
9
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(7b)

2
3
6
7
8
9
10
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(7c)

2
3
6
7
8
9
11
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(7d)

2
3
6
7
8
9
10
11
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
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Testing the same equations, but replacing Number of Farms rather than Land in
Farms produced the following equations:
(8a)

2
4
6
7
8
9
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(8b)

2
4
6
7
8
9
10
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(8c)

2
4
6
7
8
9
11
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)

(8d)

2
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
𝑌(𝑖,𝑗)
= 𝛽 + 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
+ 𝑋(𝑖,𝑗)
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CHPATER 6: EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Using the estimation strategy from the previous chapter, each hypothesis can be
tested individually, as well as against two different agricultural characteristics of the
state. The results are displayed in the elasticity tables below. Each variable in the tables
have the estimated coefficient discovered in the regression equation with the
significances identified by the number of asterisks behind the coefficient to indicate the
p-value of the coefficients. The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are in
parenthesis in the cell below each estimated coefficient. All regression equations were
tested four times: (a) the baseline equation, (b) the addition of the Number of Senators on
the Agriculture Committee variable only, (c) the addition of the Chairman binary variable
only, and (d) the inclusion of both constituency representation independent variables.
The OLS panel data method was employed for the thesis analysis.
In the first hypothesis, the amount of total farm program payments received by a
state was expected to be influenced by the state’s agricultural characteristics, with land in
farms and number of farms being the most significant forces behind how much each state
receives in farm program payments. The results for the first set of equations are reported
in Table 6 to test the first hypothesis.
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Table 6: (1) OLS Estimation Results for All Federal Government Farm Payments
Broadly, Including Land in Farms
Variables
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Dependent Variable: All Federal Government Farm Payments (Direct, Crop Insurance Subsidy, Crop
Insurance Indemnity)
CRP Acres Under Contract
220.706***
160.975***
218.383***
162.390***
(17.700)
(18.371)
(17.630)
(18.370)
All Commodities Cash Receipts
0.043***
0.040***
0.042***
0.040***
(.0017)
(.0016)
(.0016)
(.0016)
Land in Farms
2.904***
4.227***
3.085***
4.262***
(.767)
(.759)
(.765)
(.758)
Number of Senators on Ag
1.61e+08***
1.54e+08***
Committee
(1.75e+07)
(1.79e+07)
Ag Committee Chairman (=1 if state
2.12e+08***
1.08e+08*
had a Chairman for the year)
(5.81e+07)
(5.78e+07)
Constant
-1.56e+07
-2.05e+07
5.10e+07***
5.20e+07***
(1.27e+07)
(1.29e+07)
(1.27e+07)
(1.29e+07)
Observations
1350
1350
1350
1350
R-squared
0.6223
0.6445
0.6260
0.6454
Standard errors in parenthesis
*p<0.1
**p<0.05
***p<0.01

In the baseline equation (a), all agricultural characteristics were found to be
significant and positively contributed to federal farm program payments. However the
largest influence was in CRP acres rather than land in farms. This could be due to the
CRP rental payment rate that is guaranteed for every acre enrolled in the program, rather
than production. One more acre enrolled in CRP would increase a rental payment to the
state positively. Similarly, when there is more production of agricultural commodities in
in a state to produce cash receipts, then there will be a positive increase in payments to
the state. Whether it is in the form of direct payments, crop insurance subsidies, or crop
insurance indemnities is to be determined. And, the more land in farms positively
impacts the amount of program payments. This is reemphasized with the negative
constant result. If no participation occurs, states could end up paying more out of pocket,
in taxes or otherwise, than they do receiving payments.
When the independent variable that identifies how many Senators represent the
state on the Senate Agriculture Committee is incorporated in equation (b), significances
do not change, but the value of the coefficient changes. CRP acres are not as large in
payment for an additional acre entered into CRP, but the influence of land in farms nearly
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doubles in coefficient size. Given that those two independent variables are to a certain
degree correlated, the opportunity cost, on a microeconomic level, incurred by a farmer
due to the decision of whether to retire working land from farming into CRP is
emphasized. In this estimation, by taking land out of production, he or she could receive
$160 per acre, rather than incurring costs associated with production.
When the independent binary variable is included to account for whether the
Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee was impactful on behalf of the state, the
coefficients and significances returned to figures similar of the baseline equation (a).
However, the Chairmanship was found to be significant in this first set to answer the
broader question that being Agriculture Committee Chairman elevates the representation
of the state in which the Chairman is from. When both independent variables were
included, the Chairmanship binary variable, though still somewhat significant, was found
to be less significant than the other independent variables.
When looking at the best fit of the model, the r-squared value for including a
state’s Senators on the Agriculture Committee improved slightly over not including the
independent variable. When only including the Chairmanship variable, the r-squared
value dipped. However, it recovered to be the best fitted model when both constituency
representation independent variables were considered in the equation, regardless of the
variables’ significance.
As seen in Table 7, when the independent variable Land in Farms is switched for
Number of Farms, the difference is minimal in terms of coefficients and significances.
The r-squared value is improved slightly when number of farms is considered, rather than
land, but both show high significance. Number of farms surpassed the rental rate of a
CRP acre in influence, making it clear that, broadly, the number of farms is a larger
influence on the amount of farm program payments. This would be consistent with
literature in that a state is to be represented by its constituency, which, in this case, could
be the agricultural characteristics of the state. The standard errors are smaller across the
results when including Number of Farms, indicating this is most likely a better statistical
fit of results in order to analyze the impact of the Senate Agriculture Committee.
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Table 7: (2) OLS Estimation Results for All Federal Government Farm Payments
Broadly, Including Number of Farms
Variables

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Dependent Variable: All Federal Government Farm Payments (Direct, Crop Insurance Subsidy, Crop
Insurance Indemnity)
CRP Acres Under Contract
225.028***
187.877***
226.297***
189.705***
All Commodities Cash Receipts
Number of Farms

(11.637)

(12.004)

(11.602)

(12.069)

0.036***

0.034***

0.036***

0.034***

(.0018)

(.0017)

(.0018)

(.0018)

2867.849***

3064.681***

2846.277***

3048.637***

(315.086)

(306.594)

(314.011)

(306.692)

Number of Senators on Ag
Committee

1.54e+08***

1.49e+08***

(1.68e+07)

(1.73e+07)

Ag Committee Chairman (=1 if state
had a Chairman for the year)

Constant

Observations
R-squared

1.86e+08***

7.97e+07

(5.66e+07)

(5.65e+07)

5.35e+07***
(1.32e+07)

8.62e+07***
(1.33e+07)

5.69e+07***
(1.32e+07)

8.66e+07***
(1.33e+07)

1350

1350

1350

1350

0.6404

0.6615

0.6433

0.6620

Standard errors in parenthesis
*p<0.1
**p<0.05
***p<0.01

The first hypothesis is visited again, along with two, three, and four, when the
independent variables are broken down by commodities. Table 8 shows the results of
commodity and production influences on all federal government farm program payments.
The agricultural characteristics of a state, for the most part, influence the outcome of how
much federal government farm payments are going to states.
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Table 8: (3) OLS Estimation Results for All Federal Government Farm Payments Based
on Commodities, Including Land in Farms
Variables
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Dependent Variable: All Federal Government Farm Payments (Direct, Crop Insurance Subsidy, Crop
Insurance Indemnity)
CRP Acres Under Contract
116.077***
93.8758***
114.227***
93.7128***
(18.373)
(18.887)
(18.392)
(18.8893)
Animals and products cash receipts
0.046***
0.045***
0.046***
0.0453***
(0.0046)
(0.0045)
(0.0046)
(0.0045)
Rice cash receipts
0.0899
0.0385
0.0810
0.0356
(0.055)
(0.056)
(0.0556)
(0.0564)
Wheat cash receipts
0.2502***
0.2493***
0.2525***
0.2506***
(0.0331)
(0.0328)
(0.0310)
(0.0329)
Corn cash receipts
0.1719***
0.1648***
0.1707***
0.1644***
(0.0068)
(0.0070)
(0.0069)
(0.0070)
Cotton cash receipts
0.3089***
0.329***
0.3072***
0.3272***
(0.0386)
(0.0386)
(0.0386)
(0.0386)
Land in Farms
2.031***
2.383***
2.1282***
2.4218***
(0.7456)
(0.7443)
(0.7472)
(0.7456)
Number of Senators on Ag
7.07e+07***
6.80e+07***
Committee
(1.56e+07)
(1.59e+07)
Ag Committee Chairman (=1 if state
8.26e+07*
4.43e+07
had a Chairman for the year)
(4.83e+07)
(4.88e+07)
Constant
-1.18e+07
-2.53e+07**
-1.37e+07
-2.59e+07**
(1.07e+07)
(1.11e+07)
(1.08e+07)
(1.11e+07)
Observations
1350
1350
1350
1350
R-squared
0.7476
0.7514
0.7481
0.7496
Standard errors in parenthesis
*p<0.1
**p<0.05
***p<0.01

As expected, all independent variables have positive signs, indicating that the
more participation in farm production, the more farm program payments to come. Again,
a negative constant is estimated and those with no production may pay more into the farm
program payment pool rather than receive payments. All commodity production is
significant to the impact of farm program payments, except rice, and an increase in one
acre of farm land is estimated to generate another two dollars in farm program payments.
Cotton receipts dominate in coefficient impact. Every one dollar increase in cotton cash
receipts for a state increases all government farm program payments by 31 cents. This
compares to wheat at 25 cents and corn at 17 cents for increases in one dollar of cash
receipts. Rice, as mentioned, is not significant to all federal farm program payments,
even though producers stand to benefit in all areas of program types when growing rice.
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This could be presumed because rice is not grown on as much land as other commodities,
but can only be confirmed when we test number of farms.
When the Number of Senators on the Agriculture Committee variable is included,
the results mildly vary. Coefficients for significant commodity cash receipts decrease by
one cent, except for cotton which increases to a 33 cent impact. Rice falls even further in
significance and impact. However, the constant is now significant, which has been the
trend thus far in the estimation when including this independent variable. CRP acres fall
significantly when the Agriculture Committee member is included, but remain
significant, most likely due to the functioning of the CRP program. Adding the
Agriculture Committee Chairmanship is estimated to only be slightly significant to the
estimation and the other independent variables results revert back to equation (a)
estimation levels and significances. The constant is, now, no longer significant, as well.
Including both variables in the regression yields significance only in the number
of Senators and again in the constant. This is the best fitting model according to the rsquared value for this set of equations. Rice is still not significant in impact to all federal
government farm payments, while cotton remains king in the estimation as it yields
nearly 33 cents of payment for every additional cash receipt dollar.
Addressing the second hypothesis, though agricultural characteristics are
influential in total federal government farm payments, having a representative for the
state on the United States Senate Agriculture Committee was estimated to be more
influential in the amount of total farm program payments. It was consistently seen across
all four regressions estimating the dependent variable of total federal government farm
payments that the number of Senators on the Agriculture Committee was significant with
coefficients ranging from $68 million to over $100 million in farm payments back to the
state. This is most likely due to the reasoning that Senators on the Agriculture
Committee have a vested, constituent interest (Bellemare & Carnes, 2014). By sitting on
the Agriculture Committee, the Senator has the ability to lobby and negotiate on behalf of
his or her state for farm bill programs favorable to constituents’ interests.
The third hypothesis predicted the position of Chairman of the Agriculture
Committee to be relevant, but not as significant as having a seat on the Agriculture
Committee or a significant agricultural constituency. When isolated, the Chairmanship
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was actually very significant except in all farm program payments when commodity cash
receipts are included according to number of farms. Significance slightly improves when
land in farms is included. This would indicate that a Senate Agriculture Chairman, who
expectedly represents an agricultural area, will represent his or her state broadly, but will
not abuse the position of power to gain an inequitable advantage on behalf of the
constituency. Or, other committee members may not allow it to happen. Chairman also
takes the role very seriously to conduct business and execute policy. Literature indicates
the path to Chairmanship is through endogenous factors within the Senate itself, rather
than the constituency (Brooks, 1997). Though the Chairman is selected from the
Senators’ colleagues, their selection has little to do with the state’s influence and more to
do with the individual’s resume. There is an expectation for the Chairman to represent
the whole committee in addition to his or her constituency.
Taking a second look at the estimation and exchanging the agriculture
characteristic variable to Number of Farms, the results are somewhat influenced
differently from the previous results. The estimation results are below in Table 9.
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Table 9: (4) OLS Estimation Results for All Federal Government Farm Payments Based
on Commodities, Including Number of Farms
Variables
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Dependent Variable: All Federal Government Farm Payments (Direct, Crop Insurance Subsidy, Crop
Insurance Indemnity)
CRP Acres Under Contract
116.271***
101.317***
116.207***
101.741***
(13.583)
(13.934)
(13.577)
(13.951)
Animals and products cash receipts
0.035***
0.034***
0.035***
0.034***
(0.0048)
(0.0048)
(0.0048)
(0.0048)
Rice cash receipts
0.1155**
0.0648
0.1072*
0.0625
(0.055)
(0.055)
(0.055)
(0.056)
Wheat cash receipts
0.2865***
0.2840***
0.2879***
0.2848***
(0.0330)
(0.0328)
(0.0330)
(0.0328)
Corn cash receipts
0.1665***
0.1598***
0.1655***
0.1595***
(0.0067)
(0.0069)
(0.0068)
(0.0069)
Cotton cash receipts
0.2508***
0.2761***
0.2512***
0.2756***
(0.0374)
(0.0376)
(0.0374)
(0.0376)
Number of Farms
2292.955*** 2296.675*** 2289.696*** 2295.044***
(318.535)
(316.472)
(318.404)
(316.545)
Number of Senators on Ag
6.58e+07***
6.38e+07***
Committee
(1.53e+07)
(1.55e+07)
Ag Committee Chairman (=1 if state
6.98e+07
3.25e+07
had a Chairman for the year)
(4.74e+07)
(4.80e+07)
Constant
4.25e+07*** 5.41e+07*** 4.38e+07*** 5.43e+07***
(1.15e+07)
(1.17e+07)
(1.15e+07)
(1.17e+07)
Observations
R-squared

1350
0.7556

1350
0.7590

1350
0.7560

1350
0.7591

Standard errors in parenthesis
*p<0.1
**p<0.05
***p<0.01

Number of Farms is as significant as Land in Farms, but this estimation found rice
to have slight significance in the estimation. This time, wheat is the dominant
commodity in cash receipts impacting farm program payments at 28 cents increase in
farm program payments for every additional dollar of wheat production receipts. The
estimation implies that for each state, if it were to gain one farm, it could expect
$2292.95 in farm program payments. In this scenario, as well, the constant is now
significant in all four trial equations and the estimation overall statistically fits better than
when estimated with land in farms according to the slight jump in r-squared.
The Number of Senators on the Agriculture Committee variable holds strong
significance to the estimation, but cash receipts moved around in coefficients. Rice is no
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longer significant and dropped about five cents, while wheat remained constant and corn
barely decreased. Cotton saw a two cent increase and number of farms raised four
dollars. When Chairmanship is included individually, it is not significant to the equation.
Rice is very slightly significant, but other commodities and number of farms are
consistently significant. The coefficients move back closer to levels held when neither
test variable was included. This time, two models fit best statistically, including the
regression with the Number of Senators on the Agriculture Committee independent
variable and with both constituency representation variables included, but only slightly
better fits compared to the other two equations in this set. It was also only slightly a
better fit model to include the Number of Farms variable rather than Land in Farms.
The fourth hypothesis, that total farm program payments would be significantly
influenced by CRP acres and specific commodity cash receipts, was supported in the
above tables. Since CRP is a direct payment program and was discussed earlier to be a
potential substitute to production on that land on the microeconomic level, its influence
was particularly important to analyze in conjunction with the commodities being
produced. Each time the equation was estimated, the CRP influence could be interpreted
a rental payment per acre returned to the state to accommodate for that program.
Presumably, the CRP influence could be due to the calculation of CRP rental payments
and the influence those have in overall farm policy. One of the issues discussed in
today’s farm bill debate is the discussion of CRP rental rates inflating surrounding land
rents across the country. This estimation could provide insight into the true rent value
estimated to each state, on average, when land is entered into CRP.
Commodity influence, however, tends to be more inconsistent across the tests
thus far in significances and coefficients. However, other observations about commodity
roles in farm program payments can be made. Corn was determined to not be as
influential as cotton or wheat, while rice was the most inconsistent commodity to be
included. With rice only grown in the Mississippi Delta region and a minor portion of
the Pacific coast, the representation for rice is largely limited, not only in constituency
representation, but also agricultural characteristics of states.
The fifth hypothesis shifted directions to analyze the influence on direct farm
program payments by the amount of cash receipts for a specific commodity in a state.
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Research and literature pointed towards cotton and corn to be the predominant crops in
the farm policy arena and it was anticipated that those two would hold coefficients larger
than the other commodities. However, as seen in Table 10, this was not the case.

Table 10: (5) OLS Estimation Results for Federal Government Direct Farm Payments
Based on Commodities, Including Land in Farms
Variables
(a)
Dependent Variable: Federal Government Direct Farm
Payments
CRP Acres Under Contract
176.4502***
(14.779)
Animals and products cash receipts
0.0290***
(0.0037)
Rice cash receipts
0.1813***
(0.0447)
Wheat cash receipts
-0.1501***
(0.0266)
Corn cash receipts
0.0488***
(0.0055)
Cotton cash receipts
0.0453
(0.0310)
Land in Farms
1.1885**
(0.5997)
Number of Senators on Ag
Committee

(b)

(c)

(d)

146.1461***
(14.9716)
0.0276***
(0.0036)
0.1111**
(0.0446)
-0.1514***
(0.0260)
0.0390***
(0.0055)
0.0726**
(0.0306)
1.6688***
(0.5900)
9.65e+07***

173.6126***
(14.7512)
0.0290***
(0.0036)
0.1676***
(0.0447)
-0.1466***
(0.0265)
0.0470***
(0.0055)
0.0426
(0.0309)
1.3378**
(0.5993)

145.8705***
(14.9569)
0.0277***
(0.0036)
0.1063**
(0.0446)
-0.1493***
(0.0260)
0.0384***
(0.0055)
0.0698**
(0.0305)
1.7349***
(0.5904)
9.20e+07***

(1.24e+07)
Ag Committee Chairman (=1 if state
had a Chairman for the year)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

3.60e+07***
(8625582)
1350
0.5631

1.75e+07**
(8766303)
1350
0.5821

1.27e+08***

(1.26e+07)
7.49e+07*

(3.87e+07)
3.30e+07***
(8643280)
1350
0.5665

(3.86e+07)
1.66e+07*
(8770071)
1350
0.5832

Standard errors in parenthesis
*p<0.1
**p<0.05
***p<0.01

For Direct Farm Program Payment estimation in Table 10, the first equation
without either constituency representation variables, all commodities except cotton were
found to be significant, as well as CRP acres and land in farms. Rice now dominated the
coefficient impact, expecting about 18 cents in direct payments for every additional
dollar in cash receipts. Wheat unexpectedly had a negative coefficient, especially after
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being so dominant in the previous tests. This time, as well, the constant was positive and
significant to the estimation.
With the addition of the Number of Senators on the Ag Committee variable, rice
becomes slightly less significant and cotton becomes slightly significant and dominates
corn in its coefficient impact. For every additional cash receipt dollar in cotton while
representation on the Agriculture Committee is considered, a state can expect an
additional seven cents in payments while corn yields only four cents. However, rice is
the largest impact coefficient at eleven cents for every additional production cash receipt.
The constant is slightly less significant than before, but the r-squared value is increased to
be a better statistical fit to the data.
When the Chairmanship is isolated as a test, results are once again similar to the
baseline (a) test that did not include the constituency representation variables. However,
the Chairmanship isolated is very significant to direct payments, but cotton is no longer
significant and land in farms is slightly less significant again. Wheat continues to be
unexpectedly negative and rice dominates in coefficient values at 16 cents.
Putting both constituency representation variables in the equation revert the
results back to similar values of equation (b). Again, it is the best statistical fit according
to the r-squared value. All variables are significant to some degree, though cotton and
rice are not significant to the degree of corn and wheat. The number of Senators on the
Agriculture Committee is more significant than the Chairmanship, but both are
significant.
These results are not in agreement with the literature regarding cotton and corn,
but these results also bring inconsistencies seen in the previous tests. Table 10, shows
cotton to be only slightly significant with very small standard errors when land in farms
and the constituency representation variables are included and rice was the largest
coefficient beneficiary in the estimation. Additionally, the Number of Senators on the
Agriculture Committee variable was significant in both equations it was incorporated
into, with a coefficient of over $96 million and $92 million, respectively. This
observation points directly to the literature expressing the significance of having a
representative on the Senate Agriculture Committee when considering direct farm
payments. Though a state’s production levels in cash receipts could draw attention to the
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state’s agricultural needs in a farm bill, it is not as valuable, quantitatively, as having a
seat at the legislative table.
Including number of farms in Table 11, rather than land in farms like in Table 10,
produces a better statistical fit all around for this test according to the r-squared. In the
first test, all commodities, CRP and number of farms are significant, except for cotton.
Wheat, again, has a negative coefficient unexpectedly. When a member of the Senate
Agriculture Committee is accounted for, the results hold similar in their significance.
Committee presence is also considered significant. Cotton is, once again, interesting in its
negative-signed, insignificant coefficient. The standard error of the estimation provides
the assumption that it could go between positive and negative often and the insignificance
verify that. Thus it would be important for a state producing cotton to be represented on
the Agriculture Committee in order to tip the direct payments towards a positive
influence for the state.
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Table 11: (6) OLS Estimation Results for Federal Government Direct Farm Payments
Based on Commodities, Including Number of Farms
Variables
(a)
Dependent Variable: Federal Government Direct
Farm Payments
CRP Acres Under Contract
155.7187***
(10.6714)
Animals and products cash receipts
0.0144***
(0.0037)
Rice cash receipts
0.2219***
(0.0429)
Wheat cash receipts
-0.1019***
(0.0259)
Corn cash receipts
0.0425***
(0.0053)
Cotton cash receipts
-0.0477
(0.0294)
Number of Farms
2686.37***
(250.2541)
Number of Senators on Ag
Committee

(b)

(c)

(d)

134.533***
(10.7754)
0.0136***
(0.0037)
0.1501***
(0.0429)
-0.1053***
(0.0253)
0.0330***
(0.0053)
-0.0118
(0.0291)
2691.641***
(244.7287)
9.32e+07***

155.6095***
(10.6358)
0.0147***
(0.0038)
0.2079***
(0.0430)
-0.0995***
(0.0258)
0.0408***
(0.0053)
-0.0470
(0.0293)
2680.890***
(249.4242)

135.3846***
(10.7778)
0.0138***
(0.0037)
0.1454***
(0.0430)
-0.1038***
(0.0253)
0.0325***
(0.0053)
-0.0130
(0.0291)
2688.368***
(244.5442)
8.92e+07***

(1.18e+07)
Ag Committee Chairman (=1 if state
had a Chairman for the year)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-4331846
(9038766)
1350
0.5965

-2.06e+07**
(9077323)
1350
0.6144

1.17e+08***

(1.20e+07)
6.53e+07*

(3.71e+07)
-6522597
(9035147)
1350
0.5994

(3.71e+07)
-2.12e+07**
(9074942)
1350
0.6153

Standard errors in parenthesis
*p<0.1
**p<0.05
***p<0.01

The coefficient increased for the Committee membership variable and coefficients
for specific commodities lessened. The Chairmanship is similar in its results of
significance and coefficients. It is expected at this point that the final equation would be
the best statistical fit while including both constituency representation variables and this
estimation confirms the prediction according to the r-squared value. Cotton is not
significant, again, but the Chairmanship has also fallen in significance since being tested
independently. This reemphasizes, now even more, the importance of a state having a
seat on the Agriculture Committee in terms of gaining a state more money in direct farm
program payments.
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The final hypothesis concerned crop insurance subsidies and predicted they would
predominantly be influenced by agricultural characteristics. This was out of the norm
from previous hypotheses, but literature indicated that since its inclusion in the farm bill,
crop insurance has emerged as the dominant farm program. And as the farm bill
transitioned through time, crop insurance has become the primary risk safety net tool and
it has risen to the top of the priority list for not only farm constituents, but also farm
lobby groups who both pressure and influence Members of Congress’ vote in favor of
maintaining crop insurance (Bellemare & Carnes, 2014). Thus it was predicted to be a
staple for the farm bill.
The results coincided with this estimation. Most of the commodities represented
in crop insurance subsidies held significance over the constituency representation
variables included in the estimation shown in Table 12. It would be safe to say, from this
estimation, that a state could not be represented on the Senate Agriculture Committee or
in the position of Chairman and still receive crop insurance subsidies for the respective
commodities
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Table 12: (7) OLS Estimation Results for Crop Insurance Subsidy Based on
Commodities, Including Land in Farms
Variables
Dependent Variable: Crop Insurance
Subsidy
Rice cash receipts
Wheat cash receipts
Corn cash receipts
Cotton cash receipts
Land in Farms

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

0.0083
(0.0114)
0.1570***
(0.0058)
0.0506***
(0.0012)
0.1189***
(0.0075)
-0.4179***
(0.1065)

0.0098
(0.0116)
0.1577***
(0.0059)
0.0509***
(0.0012)
0.1182***
(0.0076)
-0.4080***
(0.1075)
-2212116
(3192769)

0.0090
(0.0114)
0.1569***
(0.0058)
0.0507***
(0.0012)
0.1190***
(0.0075)
-0.4219***
(0.1067)

-7329923

0.0102
(0.0116)
0.1575***
(0.0059)
0.0509***
(0.0012)
0.1185***
(0.0076)
-0.4130***
(0.1078)
-1838569
(3253718)
-36209651

(1.02e+07)
-8392999***
(2136243)
1350
0.7231

(1.04e+07)
-8078273***
(2208181)
1350
0.7232

Number of Senators on Ag Committee
Ag Committee Chairman (=1 if state
had a Chairman for the year)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-8554564***
(2124090)
1350
0.7230

-8146185***
(2204750)
1350
0.7231

Standard errors in parenthesis
*p<0.1
**p<0.05
***p<0.01

This test proved to be the most unique in the analysis. In the first test, all
commodities except rice were found to be significant to the crop insurance subsidy. Land
in farms held an unexpected negative impact at a strong significance. For every
additional acre in farming, a state could expect about a 42-cent decrease in crop insurance
subsidies. Cotton and wheat dominated in subsidy impact: for every additional dollar in
wheat cash receipts, one could expect 15 cents in crop insurance subsidy; while for every
additional dollar in cotton cash receipts, one could expect 12 cents in crop insurance
subsidy. This is one of the best statistically fit models of the results with the r-squared
for all four tests at 72%.
When the committee membership variable is included, it is a smaller coefficient
than other tests and is not significant. Additionally, it is a negative sign, which is a
completely different estimation from the other tests that included the direct farm program
payments. Only wheat, corn, cotton, and land in farms are significant to the test.
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Agriculture Committee Chairmanship had a similar result with a negative sign and being
insignificant to the equation. Rice continued to be insignificant. When both variables
were included in the equation, though their coefficients significantly decreased in impact,
they were still estimated to have negative signs and not be significant.

Table 13: (8) OLS Estimation Results for Crop Insurance Subsidy Based on
Commodities, Including Number of Farms
Variables
Dependent Variable: Crop Insurance
Subsidy
Rice cash receipts
Wheat cash receipts
Corn cash receipts
Cotton cash receipts
Number of Farms

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

0.0146
(0.0113)
0.1473***
(0.0050)
0.0507***
(0.0013)
0.1121***
(0.0076)
-138.9633**
(57.8172)

0.0165
(0.0114)
0.1486***
(0.0052)
0.0510***
(0.0013)
0.1112***
(0.0077)
-132.7068**
(58.2076)
-2982210

0.0152
(0.0113)
0.1472***
(0.0050)
0.0508***
(0.0013)
0.1120***
(0.0076)
-138.9645**
(57.8330)

0.0168
(0.0115)
0.1484***
(0.0052)
0.0511***
(0.0013)
0.1112***
(0.0077)
-133.1456**
(58.2402)
-2773412

Number of Senators on Ag
Committee

(3196564)
Ag Committee Chairman (=1 if state
had a Chairman for the year)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-8256229***
(2443396)
1350
0.7210

-7760715***
(2500572)
1350
0.7212

-5242058

(3253045)
-3618087

(1.02e+07)
-8162363***
(2450859)
1350
0.7211

(1.04e+07)
-7730622***
(2502874)
1350
0.7212

Standard errors in parenthesis
*p<0.1
**p<0.05
***p<0.01

Unlike the other sets of equations, when land of farms was replaced with number
of farms in Table 13, number of farms was found to be less significant. It also held an
unexpected negative sign on its coefficient, so that when one additional farm is added, the
state can expect a decrease in crop insurance subsidies by about $139. This model is,
also, ever so slightly less of a better fit than the previous test. Rice is, again, not
significant. Wheat is the dominant coefficient at 14 cents of crop insurance subsidy for
every additional dollar of cash receipts produced.
When Number of Senators on the Agriculture Committee variable is included, it
is has an unexpected negative impact, and is not significant. When the Chairmanship is
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included, it is also a negative sign, and is not significant. There are similar interactions
when the two are included together. This leads to the presumption that crop insurance
subsidies could be primarily driven by the amount of crop liabilities being covered by the
insurance. It could also imply, given agricultural economic conditions. that there are
possible financial obstacles placed on a farmer when deciding to purchase crop insurance
on a microeconomic level even with the subsidy.
Overall, this chapter investigates the hypotheses developed from the empirical
research and literature review in an attempt to answer the research question at hand.
Using the OLS panel data method, several estimations were performed to estimate the
impact a seat on the Senate Agriculture Committee has on farm program payments. The
conclusions drawn from these results are presented in the next chapter.
.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Following extensive data research, a thorough literature review, and running
empirical models to estimate the quantitative impacts, much can be said about the
influences of farm program payments. More specifically, the role of a member of the
Senate Agriculture Committee is more narrowly assessed and conclusions can be drawn
from these results. The conclusions of this thesis are presented below, first looking
broadly, and then narrowing in focus. Included in this section, as well, are a discussion
of the limitations of the study and recommendations on future research needed to be done
regarding the topic.
Conclusions
From this thesis there are three major conclusions to be drawn. The first is that
constituent interests drive the farm program payments received by a state, specifically in
the constituency represented by a Senator on the Senate Agriculture Committee. The
second is that a state does not necessarily need its Senator to serve as the Chairman of the
Senate Agriculture Committee to receive significant farm program payments. And third,
there are programs in the farm bill that are not influenced by constituency representation,
and there are specific crops that have more influence over certain farm program
payments.
Broadly, farm program payments are important to agriculture producing states.
These states gain a competitive advantage to receiving farm program payments if
represented by a Senator on the Senate Agriculture Committee. This is because all work
done on a farm bill is done at the committee level and legislators are more inclined to
represent their constituents while sitting on a constituency-oriented committee. The
empirical results confirm this when the constituency representation variable of the
Number of Senators on the Agriculture Committee was significant in all but two of the
estimation sets (more on this later). Additionally, the models’ statistical accuracy, or
“best fit”, improved each time the Number of Senators on the Agriculture Committee
variable was included. This validated the inclusion of the variable in the models.
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There is a synergistic benefit for a Senator from an agricultural state to represent
his or her constituents on the Senate Agriculture Committee. Each Senator serves on the
Agriculture Committee with a distinct purpose and agenda to represent the commodity or
program most important to his or her constituents. Then, he or she bases the voting
record on the deal he or she can negotiate on the constituency’s behalf. Thus, when
empirical results show a large increase in payments for states with representation, it is
proven valuable for a Senator to represent those interests. Lee/Tkachyk’s “‘economic’
theory of politics” confirms the synergy implied in the empirical results when describing
the marginal benefit to a state in the amount of farm program payments gained when the
value on the constituency-oriented Senate Agriculture Committee is optimized for the
Senator to build clout and influence that will increase the margin of return in reelection.
Senators serve on the committee in the faith it is in the best interest of the agricultural
constituency to provide more farm program payments to the constituents in hopes of
getting reelected.
The second conclusion is that a state does not necessarily need its Senator to serve
as the Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee to receive farm program payments.
However, the hierarchy of the position does provide political leverage that was proven to
be a significant influence in majority of the estimations. With that said, it is incredibly
difficult for a Chairman to gain an inequitable or unrealistic portion of farm program
payments on behalf of his or her constituents because of the governance of the committee
and the duties entailed in Chairmanship. The position does bring more clout and
influence to the resume of the Senator as Chairman that may provide political leverage
for other policy matters on behalf of his or state’s constituency.
Third, there are programs in the farm bill that are not influenced by constituency
representation, like crop insurance according to the estimation, and some crops have
more influence on some farm program payments than others, such as rice according to
the estimation. Crop insurance subsidies were empirically proven to not be influenced by
having Senators on the Agriculture Committee or Chairman. This is unique compared to
Federal Government direct farm program payments that were influenced by specific
commodities, though inconsistently. It could be, then, implied that crop insurance
subsidies have a less volatile and less uncertain position in farm program payments than
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other programs, since they are estimated to not be significantly influenced by
constituency representation.
Finally, seats on the Senate Agriculture Committee are not very common, as seen
in Appendix 3. Many Senators serve a long term on the committee while in Congress
because of the value it holds to not only their constituents, but to themselves in the
synergistic relationship, as well. There is an expectation to build farm policy experience
and expertise while on the committee in order to learn and understand the issues before
policy making can occur. The vetting process to get on the Senate Agriculture
Committee is not guaranteed to every agricultural state. Therefore, the seats are special
and should be valued by not only the Senator, but the constituency represented by the
seat.
Referencing back to the example of Indiana, these conclusions can be applied to
the state. It is recommended that Indiana maintain its constituency representation on the
Senate Agriculture Committee by reelecting its Senator and conveying the importance of
continuing to represent the state on the committee. However, the empirical results
indicate the committee representation would only be beneficial in the conservation
programs and commodity programs, which are two of the three top priorities for the
Indiana farmers in the survey. Crop insurance, the number one priority, is assumed to be
protected without representation on the Senate Agriculture Committee. If Indiana’s
Senator were to move up to Chairman, it would benefit the constituency in its ability to
leverage more political clout and have more influence on farm program payments.
Overall, these conclusions emphasize that though the farm bill has a lot of depth,
as indicated in this thesis, as well, its foundation is based on the constituency it serves.
Representation while debating a farm bill will provide more to the state constituency and
help those agricultural producers mitigate the current challenges of agriculture.
Limitations of this Study
The largest and most pertinent limitation of this study is the fact that it is the first
of its kind. Much of the research done to this point has not explored the drivers of farm
program payments and what specifically influences how much a state receives in farm
bill support. This study is limited to being broad in perspective and generalized in scope.
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The data variables used for this study could be altered to better characterize the
agricultural constituency of the area. States with little to no agriculture were included,
but may not be characterized properly. Most recent examples would be the increased
attention to specialty crop producers who would not be included as an independent
variable in the model’s current form. Accommodations for the boom and bust cycle for
each commodity were not incorporated, either. By labeling the boom and bust portions
of those commodities, the regression estimation may improve its accuracy in best
statistical fit.
The inclusion of animals and products may limit the study. It was determined for
this thesis to be necessary because it represented the milk industry that would receive
direct payments. However, it could be characterizing the representation incorrectly since
livestock producers tend not to have much at stake in a farm bill. But the variable was
found in the empirical analysis to have significant influence on farm program payments.
The Members of the Senate Agriculture Committee are a limitation because they
not consistent over the year time series. This model was done on an annual basis. One
member may not have served a whole year on the agriculture committee but credited in
the estimation as serving for the year. There is also the limitation that a farm bill is only
debated every five years. Conversations may begin one to two years prior to the renewal,
but the members who debate the bill on behalf of the constituency may not be responsible
for how the final version comes to fruition. In the same note, members may join the
committee in the midst of a farm bill debate and not be prepared to debate on behalf of
the constituency. These members were still credited with the positive impact the
representation brought to the state.
Recommendations for Future Research
For future research, this topic, in general, needs to be explored further. There is a
lot of research about the process leading up to a farm bill, but not as much about the
direct impacts of the farm bill. There is also the opportunity to explore the specific
commodities further. Casual conversations regarding the political environment of farm
policy can lend itself to the perception of power in farm bill discussions, while empirical
analysis can prove otherwise. Also, more research could be done to confirm or refute the
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results obtained in this thesis regarding specific commodities, as well as the inclusion of
boom and bust cycle indicators. The role of CRP rental rates could be further explored
given the assumed impact they had in this thesis.
The role of crop liability on farm program payments could be researched further.
This study stayed within the parameters of the amount of money the government paid,
but more research could be done, especially regarding the return on investment, about the
influence of crop liability. In the same note, more research could be done to provide
insight into the influences on crop liability based on specific commodities.
Each of these research recommendations could be applied at the individual state
level to explore the specific influences in each state. More research could be done at the
county level, as well, to see the utilization of farm programs down to the local level.
There is more research to be done about how the example in this thesis, Indiana, uses the
farm bill and its representation history on the Senate Agriculture Committee.
More work could be done to explore the role of constituency representation in
Congress. There are more committees to explore and investigate to determine what
influences the decision making of those committees. And, the organization of the Senate
Agriculture Committee could be explored, similar to the way Jones assessed the House
Agriculture Committee’s organization. This could also give more information about the
true value behind the Chairmanship, and how the Senate Agriculture Committee operates.
Along the same lines, the role of the Chairman needs to be explored further. It is a seat
of power and prestige, but what influence does it gain constituents beyond what was
discovered in this thesis. There is so much more to learn about the farm bill and as each
new one develops and becomes law, it brings another opportunity to further the research.
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY

Appendix 1: Action Alert: Indiana Farm Bureau Farm Bill Survey
1. We anticipate another strong push to separate nutrition programs from the rest
of the Farm Bill. Consistent with Farm Bureau policy, we have previously opposed such
measures as the current policy and political relationship between nutrition programs and
farm programs has been the best course of action to ensure Congress can continue to pass
a Farm Bill because there are so few rural members of Congress. Do we continue to hold
that belief?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
128 (70%)
29 (16%)
17 (9%)
8 (4%)

2. If there will be less money in the budget baseline for the next Farm Bill,
prioritization of funding will be important. Please rank your top five Farm Bill titles in
order of importance with #1 being the most important.
1st: 43
Commodity
Program ARCCO

2nd: 29
3rd: 15
4th: 13
5th: 5
1st: 2

Commodity
Program ARCIC

2nd: 14
3rd: 5
4th: 6
5th: 4
1st: 2

Commodity
Program PLC

2nd: 4
3rd: 21
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4th: 6
5th: 9
1st: 4
2nd: 6
Dairy MPP

3rd: 5
4th: 4
5th: 7
1st: 18
2nd: 26

Conservation
Programs

3rd: 28
4th: 23
5th: 18
1st: 66
2nd: 24

Crop Insurance

3rd: 15
4th: 4
5th: 11
1st: 8
2nd: 10

Energy

3rd: 13
4th: 19
5th: 16
1st: 6
2nd: 13

Rural
Development

3rd: 11
4th: 23
5th: 17
1st: 10

Trade

2nd: 24
3rd: 18
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4th: 17
5th: 20
1st: 6
2nd: 8
Research and
Extension

3rd: 19
4th: 30
5th: 19
1st: 1
2nd: 6

Forestry

3rd: 4
4th: 2
5th: 9
1st: 3
2nd: 4

Nutrition

3rd: 10
4th: 12
5th: 15
1st: 3
2nd: 4

Credit

3rd: 8
4th: 8
5th: 6
1st: 2
2nd: 3

Specialty Crops

3rd: 2
4th: 4
5th: 8

Miscellaneous
(beginning
farmers/ranchers
programs,

1st: 8
2nd: 7
3rd: 8
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livestock health,
etc.)

4th: 11
5th: 18

3. The last Farm Bill allowed farmers to reallocate (without adding to) their base
acres and update their yields. Our current policy supports including another update in the
next Farm Bill. Should farmers be allowed to update (without adding) base and yields in
the next Farm Bill?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
136 (75%)
22 (12%)
10 (5%)
14 (8%)

4. The last Farm Bill created two new revenue protection programs; one program
was a county-based program (ARC-CO) and the other was an individual program (ARCIC). The ARC-CO program was very popular with corn and soybean producers with more
than 90% of corn and soybean acres being enrolled in the program. While payments
under ARC-CO have been significant for many counties, there are also numerous
counties that have not received any assistance under the program. Current farm revenue
projections and the workings of the program mean the receiving significant/any payments
during the last two years of this Farm Bill (2017 and 2018) are very unlikely. Should we
continue to support the ARC-CO program?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
98 (54%)
40 (22%)
27 (15%)
17 (9%)

5. Under the current ARC-CO program there have been some significant countyto-county differences in revenue support payments. Should adjustments be made to the
ARC-CO program to reduce the county-to-county payment differences?
Item
Yes
No

Responses
89 (49%)
49 (27%)

136
Undecided
Need more information

21 (12%)
23 (13%)

6. Some have complained that only using a 5-year Olympic Moving Average
under ARC-CO doesn’t truly capture the yield history in some areas. Should the number
of years used for an Olympic Moving Average be adjusted when determining historical
revenue under the ARC-CO program?
Item
Yes, not sure how long
Yes to 7 years
Yes to 10 years
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
47 (26%)
35 (19%)
25 (14%)
41 (23%)
19 (10%)
15 (8%)

7. Should the ARC-CO program be modified by changing the geographic area
from a county-based program to a more regional or state-based program when
determining ARC-CO payments?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
45 (25%)
88 (48%)
29 (16%)
20 (11%)

8. Some have expressed concern over USDA’s decision to use NASS county
yields to determine county revenue under the ARC-CO program. If the ARC-CO
continues as an option within the commodity title, which of the following “yield”
numbers should be the primary yield used to set county program yields?
Item
NASS
RMA
I don't know the difference between NASS and RMA data
Need more information
9. If another data source, please specify.
Number of Responses: 12

Responses
24 (13%)
39 (21%)
60 (33%)
59 (32%)
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10. Less than 1 percent of acreage was enrolled in the ARC-IC program due to its
complicated nature and reduced coverage level. Should we continue to support ARC-IC
as a farm program option in the next Farm Bill?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information
11. If you didn't chose ARC-IC, please explain why.

Responses
26 (14%)
104 (57%)
35 (19%)
17 (9%)

Number of Responses: 62

12. If you think ARC-IC should be continued, should it be modified to make it a
better program for a greater number of producers?
Item
Responses
Yes
58 (43%)
No
25 (19%)
Undecided
26 (19%)
Need more information
25 (19%)
13. Should the reference prices for the PLC program be maintained at current
levels (wheat – $5.50/bu., peanuts – $535/ton, corn – $3.70/bu., grain sorghum –
$3.95/bu., soybeans – $8.40/bu. and rice – $14.00/cwt.)?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
67 (37%)
56 (31%)
42 (23%)
17 (9%)

14. If no, should the reference prices be increased or decreased?
Item
Increased
Decreased

Responses
49 (71%)
20 (29%)

15. One suggestion for improving the safety net centers on cottonseed – should
cottonseed to be declared an “other oilseed” and therefore become eligible for ARC or
PLC program . Do you agree with this suggestion?
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Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
51 (29%)
48 (27%)
48 (27%)
28 (16%)

16. Farm Bureau policy has long supported the idea of “farm savings accounts.”
Given the uncertain nature of agriculture, is this an idea that should be given more
priority for implementation within the next Farm Bill?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
108 (59%)
32 (18%)
19 (10%)
23 (13%)

17. To control the costs and limit the impact on the baseline budget for the farm
bill, the account would likely have a cap on the amount of money a farmer/rancher could
deposit each year. What should that cap be?
Item
$50,000 or less
$50,001-$100,000
$100,001-$150,000
$150,001 to $200,000
More than $200,000
Need more information
Answered NO to question #16

Responses
31 (17%)
34 (19%)
13 (7%)
15 (8%)
19 (10%)
49 (27%)
21 (12%)

18. Should the account be eligible to be invested and grow tax-free using after-tax
dollars such as a “Roth” account or should it work similar to an IRA or 401k using pretax dollars and be subject to taxes when money is removed?
Item
After-Tax with Tax Free Growth
Pre-Tax with Withdrawals Subject to Taxes
Other federal tax methods
Answered NO to the question #16 and would not use a Farm Savings Account
19. Other, specify:
Number of Responses: 5

Responses
95 (52%)
57 (31%)
3 (2%)
27 (15%)
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20. Should the program include a limited USDA match to the funds a
farmer/rancher would deposit in the account if the individual agreed to give up some/all
Farm Bill payments (commodity programs) or agreed to reduced crop insurance
subsidies?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information
Answered NO to the previous question

Responses
59 (32%)
50 (27%)
28 (15%)
31 (17%)
14 (8%)

21. What additional ideas do you have for a Farm Savings Account program that
would make it viable for your operation?
Number of Responses: 21

22. Maintaining funding for the federal crop insurance program was our top
priority during the prior Farm Bill debate. Does it remain our top priority?
Item
Responses
Yes
127 (70%)
No
37 (20%)
Undecided
15 (8%)
Need more information
3 (2%)
23. Some farmers continue to worry that after several years of disasters, their
Actual Production History has fallen dramatically and their premium rates have
increased. Is this something that should be addressed?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
118 (65%)
37 (20%)
17 (9%)
10 (5%)

24. If cuts had to be made to the premium discounts farmers receive through the
federal crop insurance program, what is your preferable method for reducing crop
insurance premium discounts? Please rank them in the order of your preference starting
with #1:

140
1st: 56
Reducing the
overall
premium
discount level.

2nd: 26
3rd: 43
4th: 46
5th: 11

Prohibiting
premium
discounts for
farmers earning
above specific
income levels.

1st: 53

Reducing
premium
discounts for
farmers earning
above specific
income levels
(means testing).

1st: 39

2nd: 52
3rd: 34
4th: 36
5th: 7

2nd: 63
3rd: 50
4th: 26
5th: 4
1st: 29

Capping federal
premium
discounts.

2nd: 32
3rd: 52
4th: 59
5th: 10
1st: 5
2nd: 9
3rd: 3

Other

4th: 15
5th: 150
25. Other, specify:
Number of Responses: 44
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26. If premium discounts were to be capped, what do you consider the appropriate
level?
Item
Responses
$50,000
53 (29%)
$100,000
34 (19%)
$200,000
44 (24%)
$500,000
28 (15%)
No cap
23 (13%)
27. Federal crop insurance subsidies are greater for enterprise units relative to
basic and optional units, and subsidies decline as buy-up levels increase. Please see chart
below: Assuming you could suggest specific premium subsidy reductions within this
framework, please rank the following in order of your preference starting with #1:
Reduce the
premium
discount levels
at lower buyups and
maintain the
current
discounts at
higher buy-up
levels.
Reduce the
premium
discount levels
at the higher
buy-ups and
maintain the
current
discounts at
lower buy-up
levels.
Reduce the
premium
discount levels
for enterprise
(and whole

1st: 80
2nd: 44
3rd: 58

1st: 43
2nd: 99
3rd: 40

1st: 59
2nd: 39
3rd: 84
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farm) units to
those of basic
and optional
units.
28. The current size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the
United States livestock industry will present unprecedented challenges in the event of a
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak. It will be nearly impossible to control an FMD
outbreak in livestock dense areas without the rapid use of tens of millions of doses of
FMD vaccine. Currently, the United States does not have anywhere near enough FMD
vaccine to implement such a program in the U.S. USDA projects an annual cost of $150
million in order to produce enough vaccine and store it. Is this something Farm Bureau
should make a priority in the next Farm Bill?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
88 (48%)
27 (15%)
45 (25%)
22 (12%)

29. A disease outbreak, integrator bankruptcy, or other issue could leave some
livestock and poultry producers with empty buildings and no income. Should USDA
work to create a Business Interruption Insurance program that is federally subsidized, but
requires producers to pay a yearly premium for the program if they wish to participate
(similar to federal crop insurance)?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
95 (52%)
48 (26%)
24 (13%)
15 (8%)

30. If you support this idea, what is the major commodity that you produce and on
which you would be willing to pay a premium to be covered by such a policy?
Item
Poultry (broilers and/or laying hens, or turkeys)
Hogs
Cattle

Responses
36 (30%)
41 (34%)
50 (42%)
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Sheep
Other
Do not support

13 (11%)
19 (16%)
35 (29%)

31. Are you satisfied with the safety net provided by the Dairy Margin Protection
Program (MPP)?
Item
Yes
No
I am not a dairy producer and will skip the dairy questions.

Responses
11 (6%)
19 (10%)
158 (87%)

32. Many dairy producers are not satisfied with the safety net provided by the
Dairy Margin Protection Program (MPP). Last year, dairy producers paid $70 million in
premiums and only received a payout of $750,000. In 2016, dairy producers paid more
than $20 million in premiums and have received $11 million in payments. While this
program is more of an insurance product vs. a target price program, should changes be
made to this program to improve its effectiveness as a risk management tool?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
22 (46%)
7 (15%)
11 (23%)
8 (17%)

33. If we support making changes, should we support moving the average feed
cost calculation under MPP to a regional or state level?
Item
Move feed calculation to regional level
Move feed calculation to state level
Other
34. Other, specify:

Responses
17 (36%)
20 (43%)
10 (21%)

Number of Responses: 2
35. Should the feed cost formula be increased to better reflect input costs?
Item
Yes
No

Responses
32 (70%)
4 (9%)

144
Undecided
Need more information

8 (17%)
2 (4%)

36. There are a variety of other options that may be explored to improve dairy risk
management tools. Please rank your top priorities in order of importance with #1 being
the most important.
1st: 9
2nd: 4
3rd: 2
Improve
the Livestock
Gross Margin
program

4th: 4
5th: 1
6th: 0
7th: 3
8th: 0
9th: 0
1st: 1
2nd: 8
3rd: 6

Make
MPP feed costs
regional

4th: 1
5th: 2
6th: 0
7th: 0
8th: 0
9th: 0
1st: 2
2nd: 3

Adjust
MPP feed ration
formula higher

3rd: 10
4th: 3
5th: 1
6th: 0
7th: 2
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8th: 0
9th: 1
1st: 2
2nd: 2
3rd: 2
Lower
MPP premiums
rates

4th: 5
5th: 3
6th: 2
7th: 0
8th: 0
9th: 0
1st: 3
2nd: 2
3rd: 2

Expand
MPP coverage
options

4th: 3
5th: 6
6th: 4
7th: 0
8th: 0
9th: 0
1st: 5
2nd: 0
3rd: 1

Eliminate
MPP and replace
it with a new
program

4th: 2
5th: 1
6th: 5
7th: 4
8th: 2
9th: 0

Bring
back the Milk

1st: 3
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Income Loss
Contract

2nd: 4
3rd: 1
4th: 1
5th: 2
6th: 2
7th: 4
8th: 2
9th: 1
1st: 4
2nd: 5

Lower
premium rates
for new,
beginning and
small dairy
farmers

3rd: 1
4th: 2
5th: 1
6th: 1
7th: 2
8th: 5
9th: 0
1st: 5
2nd: 0
3rd: 0
4th: 0

Other

5th: 1
6th: 2
7th: 0
8th: 3
9th: 5

37. Other, specify:
Number of Responses: 10

38. The vast majority of conservation title funding is comprised of the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) and
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the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). If we are asked to prioritize these
programs because of a lack of funding, how would you rank them in importance? Please
signify your highest priority with a 1 and then rate your second and third priorities.
1st: 102
CRP

2nd: 41
3rd: 39
1st: 52

EQIP

2nd: 74
3rd: 56
1st: 28

CSP

2nd: 67
3rd: 87

39. The 2014 Farm Bill capped enrollment in the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) at 24 million acres. Given current commodity prices, some are hoping to increase
that acreage cap. Should the enrollment cap on CRP acreage be increased?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
108 (59%)
43 (24%)
20 (11%)
11 (6%)

40. Should the enrollment cap on CRP acreage be increased in some type of prorata formula so that farmers in states currently not participating, have an opportunity to
do so?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
98 (55%)
34 (19%)
32 (18%)
14 (8%)
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41. If the CRP acreage cap is increased, it is likely that funding may be cut from
other programs. Which program area should be cut in order to pay for increasing the CRP
acreage cap?
Item
CSP
EQIP
Other conservation programs

Responses
51 (28%)
47 (26%)
84 (46%)

42. Should changes be made to State Technical Committees in order to make
them more “ag” friendly?
Item
Responses
Yes
112 (62%)
No
14 (8%)
Undecided
28 (15%)
Need more information
28 (15%)
43. Do you have suggestions on how to improve the committees?
Number of Responses: 19
44. Currently, 60 percent of EQIP dollars are mandated to be used to address
conservation issues of livestock producers. Should this level of support be continued?
Item
Responses
Yes
55 (30%)
No increase
23 (13%)
No decrease
42 (23%)
Undecided
41 (23%)
Need more information
21 (12%)
45. Given the credit situation in agriculture, should the loan amounts for FSA
credit programs be increased?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
69 (38%)
72 (40%)
26 (14%)
15 (8%)

46. If we increase the amount available per producer, fewer producers might be
helped without an increase in the overall funding amount. Congress likely will ask for
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any funding increases to come from other Farm Bill titles. Do we support a funding
reduction in other Farm Bill titles to pay for an increase to these programs?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
37 (20%)
105 (58%)
26 (14%)
14 (8%)

47. New and beginning farmer programs were significantly expanded in the last
Farm Bill. Should funding for these credit programs be increased?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
73 (40%)
79 (43%)
19 (10%)
11 (6%)

48. If funding for these programs is increased, it is likely that funding will be
taken from other Farm Bill titles. Do we support taking that funding from other Farm Bill
titles?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
49 (27%)
99 (54%)
25 (14%)
9 (5%)

49. Should the amount designated for state block grants for fruit and vegetable
producers be increased?
Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
34 (19%)
90 (49%)
42 (23%)
16 (9%)

50. Should block grants be used to help educate producers about the new Food
Safety Modernization Act or will this take too much funding away from research,
promotion and educational purposes?
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Item
Yes
No
Undecided
Need more information

Responses
54 (30%)
76 (42%)
34 (19%)
18 (10%)
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APPENDIX B. FORMS

Appendix 2: Farm Safety Net Programs (authorized under the 2014 farm bill and
other legislation) (Johnson, Previewing a 2018 Farm Bill, 2017)
Program
Instrument
Commodity
Programs
1. Price Loss
Coverage
(PLC)a

2. Agricultural
Risk Coverage
(ARC-CO)
county-level
program

3. Agricultural
Risk Coverage
(ARC-IC)
farm-level
program

Commodity Coverage

Wheat, corn, grain
sorghum, oats, barley,
long grain rice, medium
grain rice, pulse crops
(dry peas, lentils, small
chickpeas, and large
chickpeas), soybeans,
sunflower seed,
rapeseed, canola,
safflower, flaxseed,
mustard seed, crambe,
sesame seed, and
peanuts. Excludes
upland cotton.b
Same crops as PLC

Same crops as PLC.

Program Description and Projected
Outlays ($13.9 bil./yr.)
Projected Avg. Outlays FY2017-FY2027:
($5.7 bil./yr.)
Payments made if national season-average
farm price (SAFP) is below statutory
reference price (PLC). The per-unit
payment rate equals the PLC minus the
higher of the SAFP or the crop market loan
rate (fixed in statute by the farm bill).
Payments made on 85% of historical
program (base) acres times historical
program yield. No participation fee. ($3.7
billion/yr.)

Payments made if actual crop revenue
based on national SAFP and county yield
is below a guarantee (equal to 86% of
historical revenue using previous five-year
Olympic moving averages of national
SAFP and county yield). Per-unit payment
rate equals difference between the actual
crop revenue and the guarantee. Payments
made on 85% of base acres. No
participation fee. ($1.7 billion/yr.)
Payments made if cumulative farm revenue
(as defined by ARCCO) for all program
crops is below guarantee based on 86% of
historical cumulative revenue for each
crop. Payments made on 65% of base
acres. No participation fee. ($21
million/yr.)
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4. Marketing
Assistance
Loan benefits
c

Same crops as for PLC
and ARC, plus upland
cotton, extra-long staple
cotton, wool, mohair,
and honey.

5. Nonrecourse loans,
marketing
allotments, and
import quotas
6. Dairy
Margin
Protection
Program
(MPP)

Refined beet sugar and
raw cane sugar.

6. Dairy
Product
Donation
Program
(DPDP)

Milk.

Program
Instrument
Crop
Insurance,
STAX, SCO,
and NAP
7. Crop
insurance

Commodity Coverage

Milk.

More than 100 crops,
including commodity
program crops,
specialty crops (fruits,
tree nuts, vegetables,
and nursery crops),
pasture, rangeland, and
forage crops, and
livestock margins.

Nine-month nonrecourse loand at a perunit loan rate (fixed in statute), based on
actual production. Producers may repay
loan at below value if crop’s market price
is lower than its loan rate (called a market
loan gain) or take a cash payment equal to
difference (loan deficiency payment).
Farmer chooses timing. ($65 million/yr.)
Price guarantee for refined beet sugar and
raw cane sugar; limits on sales of
domestically produced sugar. ($0, designed
to be nonet cost to federal budget; instead
costs are borne by consumers.)
MPP payments made if actual two-month
average margin (milk price minus feed
cost) is below producer-selected threshold
ranging from $4/cwt. to $8/cwt. Signup fee
of $100 plus statutorily fixed premium for
coverage selected by producer. ($74
million/yr.)
DPDP requires USDA to procure and
distribute (to low-income groups) certain
dairy products when the MPP margin falls
below $4/cwt. for two consecutive months.
DPDP purchases end after three months or
if the U.S. price for certain dairy products
is significantly above world prices. ($7
million/yr.)
Program Description and Projected
Outlays ($13.9 bil./yr.)
Projected Avg. Outlays FY2017-FY2027:
($7.9 bil./yr.)

Indemnities paid when yield or revenue
drops below guarantees established prior to
planting. Coverage level (50%-85%)
selected by producer and based on
expected prices, farm and/or area yield,
and farm revenue. Loss is at field or county
level, depending on policy. Insurance
premiums are subsidized at an average
62% rate. ($7.9 billion/yr.)
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8. Stacked
Income
Protection Plan
(STAX)

Upland cotton.

9.
Supplemental
Coverage
Option (SCO)

Program crops enrolled
in PLC

A revenue-based, area-wide crop insurance
policy that may be purchased as a standalone policy for primary coverage or
purchased in tandem with an individual
farm loss policy or area policy. STAX
indemnifies losses in county revenue of
greater than 10% of expected revenue (up
to an underlying policy’s insurance
deductible if coupled) but not more than
30%. Insurance premiums are subsidized at
80% rate. ($86 million/yr.)
SCO must be purchased in conjunction
with a traditional crop insurance policy.
Indemnities are triggered by losses greater
than 14% up to the underlying policy’s
insurance deductible on an area-wide basis
only. SCO mimics the coverage, either
yield or revenue, offered by the underlying
insurance policy. Insurance premiums are
subsidized at 65% rate. (No cost estimate.)
Payments for losses in excess of 50%.
Participation fee of $250 per crop plus a
charge for higher coverage. (No cost
estimate.)

10.
Crops not covered by
Noninsured
crop insurance.
Crop Disaster
Assistance
Program
(NAP)
Disaster
Projected Avg. Outlays FY2017-FY2027:
Assistance
($0.3 bil./yr.)
11.
Beef/dairy cattle, bison,
Payment for excess livestock mortality
Supplemental
poultry, sheep, swine,
(LIP), grazing losses (LFP), other losses
Agricultural
horses, other livestock,
(ELAP), and excess fruit tree/vine
Disaster
honeybees, farm-raised
mortality (TAP). No participation fee
Assistance
fish, and
Programs e (no
trees/bushes/vines
disaster
producing an annual
designation
crop.
required)
12. Emergency
Crops and livestock
Low-interest loans for producers in a
Loans (EM)
(also physical losses to
disaster county and not eligible for
(requires
real estate).
commercial credit. Producers repay
disaster
interest/principal in one to seven years
designation)
(longer for real estate).
Source: CRS, using outlays from January 2017 CBO baseline for FY2017-FY2027.
Notes: The term safety net is used broadly here and does not assess the merits of the
various programs. Not shown is additional support for dairy and sugar producers through
import restrictions.
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a.
Producers were give a one-time choice—to last for the duration of the 2014 farm
bill (2014-2018)—for how to allocate their historical base acres by program crops and by
either PLC or county-level ARC for each crop or individual ARC, which covers all crops
with a single farm-level revenue guarantee.
b.
Upland cotton was removed from eligibility for Title I revenue support programs
by the 2014 farm bill. However, upland cotton remains eligible for support under both the
marketing assistance loan and crop insurance programs including STAX.
c.
Four types of benefits are obtainable under the marketing assistance loan
program: loan deficiency payments (LDPs), marketing loan gains (MLGs), gains derived
from use of commodity certificates, and benefits derived from forfeiting to USDA the
quantity of a commodity pledged as collateral for a nonrecourse loan.
d.
Under a non-recourse loan, farmers have the option of forfeiting their collateral
(i.e., the underlying crop), in payment of the loan rather than repaying the loan’s principal
and interest.
e.
The four additional disaster programs cited above include the Livestock
Indemnity Program (LIP); the Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP); the Emergency
Assistance for Livestock, Honey Bees, and Farm-Raised Fish Program (ELAP); and the
Tree Assistance Program (TAP)

Appendix 3: List of Senators serving on the Agriculture Committee from 1989 to Present Day
Start of Service on
Agriculture Committee
4/4/2017
1/5/1981
4/8/2011
6/15/1999
11/29/2001
1/15/1979
1/3/1991
10/12/1984
6/3/2009

End of Service on
Agriculture Committee
Present*
10/3/1996
Present
4/8/2011
3/31/2003
10/3/1996
10/8/1992
10/28/1990
Present

Last Name
Strange
Heflin
Boozman
Lincoln
Hutchinson
Pryor
Seymour
Wilson
Bennet

Party
R
D
R
D
R
D
R
R
D

State
AL
AL
AR
AR
AR
AR
CA
CA
CO

Campbell
Salazar
Allard
Hawkins
Perdue
Miller
Chambliss
Fowler
Ernst

R
D
R
R
R
D
R
D
R

CO
CO
CO
FL
GA
GA
GA
GA
IA

Spring 1995
3/9/2006
11/29/2001
1/5/1981
5/13/2015
11/29/2001
3/31/2003
1/6/1987
5/13/2015

Fall 1995
6/3/2009
3/31/2003
10/18/1986
Present
3/9/2006
4/10/2014
10/8/1992
Present

Tom
Charles
Michael
Larry
Alan
Peter
Joe
Richard
Pat
Mitch

Harkin
Grassley
Crapo
Craig
Dixon
Fitzgerald
Donnelly
Lugar
Roberts
McConnell

D
R
R
R
D
R
D
R
R
R

IA
IA
ID
ID
IL
IL
IN
IN
KS
KY

1//1985
1/3/1991
11/29/2001
1/3/1991
1/5/1981
6/15/1999
4/11/2013
1/4/1977
1/7/1997
1/3/1985

5/13/2015
11/29/2011
6/3/2009
11/29/2001
//1986
3/9/2006
Present
1/3/2013
Present
Present

Chairman

Additional Term on
Committee

12/17/2009-4/8/2011

3/9/2006-12/1/2007

11/29/01-3/31/2003
12/1/2007-12/17/2009

1/4/1995-11/29/2001
5/13/15-Present
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First Name
Luther
Howell
John
Blanche
Tim
David
John
Pete
Michael
Ben
Nighthorse
Ken
Wayne
Paula
David
Zell
Saxby
Wyche
Joni

Landrieu
Breaux
Cowan
Van Hollen
Stabenow
Klobuchar
Coleman
Dayton
Wellstone
Boschwitz
Talent
Bond
Cochran
Daines
Walsh
Baucus
Tillis
Dole
Helms
Heitkamp
Hoeven
Conrad
Andrews
Sasse
Johanns
Nelson
Kerrey
Karnes
Gillibrand
Brown
Boren
Casey

D
D
D
D
D
D
R
D
D
R
R
R
R
R
D
D
R
R
R
D
R
D
R
R
R
D
D
R
D
D
D
D

LA
LA
MA
MD
MI
MN
MN
MN
MN
MN
MO
MO
MS
MT
MT
MT
NC
NC
NC
ND
ND
ND
ND
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NY
OH
OK
PA

1/7/1997
1/6/1987
4/11/2013
4/4/2017
11/29/2001
12/1/2007
3/31/2003
11/29/2001
11/29/2001
1/15/1979
3/31/2003
1/6/1987
1/15/1979
4/4/2017
4/10/2014
1/3/1989
5/13/2015
3/31/2003
1/3/1973
4/11/2013
4/8/2011
1/6/1987
1/5/1981
5/13/2015
6/3/2009
11/29/2001
1/8/1989
3//1987
6/3/2009
12/1/2007
1/15/1979
12/1/2007

Present
10/2/1988
9/27/2013
Present
Present
Present
6/3/2009
12/1/2007
3/31/2003
10/28/1990
12/1/2007
10/28/1990
Present
Present
5/13/2015
4/10/2014
4/4/2017
3/6/2006
1/3/2003
Present
Present
4/11/2013
10/1/1986
4/4/2017
5/13/2015
4/8/2011
11/29/2001
10/2/1988
Present
Present
//1994
4/11/2013

4/8/2011-5/13/15

03/31/2003-3/9/2006

1/3/1981-12/30/1986

9/13/2013-Present
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Mary
John
William M.
Chris
Debbie
Amy
Norm
Mark
Paul D.
Rudy
James
Christopher
Thad
Steve
John E.
Max
Thomas
Elizabeth
Jesse
Heidi
John
Kent
Mark
Benjamin
Mike
E. Benjamin
J. Robert
David
Kirsten
Sherrod
David
Robert

Rick
Lindsey
John
Thomas
Tim
Phil
John
Orrin
John
Patrick
Slade
Russell
Craig

Santorum
Graham
Thune
Daschle
Johnson
Gramm
Cornyn
Hatch
Warner
Leahy
Gorton
Feingold
Thomas

R
R
R
D
D
R
R
R
R
D
R
D
R

PA
SC
SD
SD
SD
TX
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WY

1/4/1995
12/1/2007
12/1/2007
1/6/1987
1/7/1997
1/4/1995
12/17/2009
1/5/1981
1/4/1995
1/14/1975
1/3/1989
1/5/1993
11/29/2001

11/29/2001
6/3/2009
Present
1/3/2005
11/29/2001
2/17/2000
4/8/2011
10/12/1984
10/3/1996
Present
10/28/1990
12/1/1994
3/31/2003

3/9/2006-1/01/2007

1/6/1987-12/30/1994

3/9/2006-12/1/2007

Source: (Fulton & United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture, 1998), (United States. Congress. Senate.)
*Luther Strange was appointed to the Senate to replace Senator Jeff Sessions after he was appointed Attorney General in the
spring of 2017. Senator Strange lost a special primary runoff September 26, 2017, but continued to serve as Senator from Alabama
until the special general election December 12, 2017 (Martin & Burns, 2017).
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